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Do Wages Rise With JobSeniority?
ABSTRACT
The extent to which wages rise with the accumulation ofseniority (tenure) in a firmafterone controls for total labor market experience is a
fundamental question about the structure of earnings. Avariety of studies
have found a large, positive partial effect of tenureon wages. This paper
re—examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables schemeto deal
with well known estimation biases which arise from the fact thattenure is
likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics
affecting the wage. We use the variation of tenure over a given job matchas
the principal instrumental variable for tenure. The variation intenure over
the job, in contrast to variation in tenure across individuals andjobs, is
uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual specific andjob match
specific components of the error term of the wage equation. Our mainfinding
is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small, and thatgeneral labor
market experience and job shopping in the labor marketaccount for most wage
growth over a career. The strong cross section relationship between tenure











DoWages RiseWithJob Seniority ?
1. INTRODUCTION
Thispaper measures the partial effects of labor market experience andjob
seniority (tenure) on wages. Prior researchers (see Mincer andJovanovic
(1981), Bartel and Borjas (1981), Borjas (1981), Cline (1979a) andMellow (1981)
among others) have established that tenure has a strong positiverelationship
with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section—timeseries of
individuals.Furthermore, tenure has a strong negative association with job
separation rates, quits, and layoffs (Mincer and Jovanovic, Cline(1979b),
Borjas and Rosen (1981) among others). For example, Mincer andJovanovic obtain
coefficients of .0305 and —.0007 on tenure and tenure2 ina cross sectional
regression for the log wage over a sample of white males aftercontrolling for
the effects of labor market experience andschooling. They estimate the partial
effects of tenure and tenure2 on theseparation probability to be —.0149 and
.0004.* The decline ofseparations with tenure is about equally divided into a
drop in the quit rate and a drop in layoffs.
The extent to which wages rise with tenure isimportant for several
reasons. First and foremost, the wage—tenure profile isa fundamental question
about the structure of earnings over careers.Second, it is a key determinant
of the extent to which the earningspower of individuals is tied to specific
jobs and thus is important for assessment of issues suchas the losses suffered
by "displaced" workers (Hamermesh (1984)). Third, evidencethat wages rise with
job tenure has been used as an explanation for the decline inquits with tenure,
since the wage growth on the current job lowers theprobability that the worker
*See Mincer andJovanovic, Tables 1.6, 1.5. The results are basedupon the
1976 cross section of white, out of schoolmen under 64 from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics. The authors obtainslightly lower estimates of the tenure
slope of wages when heterogeneity is controlled for using an index of prior
job changes. They also report detailed results for the NLS samples ofyoung
and older men and obtain somewhat flatter tenure slopes for thesample of
older men. Mellow's estimates of the tenure slope ofwages from a sample
based upon the Current Population Survey are also large.—2—
will locate a superior alternative. In the theory of specific human capital (Oi
(1962), Becker (1962), Mincer (1974), Parsons (1972), Kuratani (1973), and
Hashimoto (1980)) the growth of wages with tenure (holding experience constant)
is attributed to worker financed investment in skills which are specific to the
firm. At the same time, firm financed investments in specific skills produce an
increase in productivity relative to wages with time on the job and thus provide
an explanation for the fall in the layoff probability with jobtenure.
More recently, a number of alternative explanations have been offered for
the apparent growth of wages with tenure.In Lazear's (1981) supervision model
of wage growth firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to
shirk duties, given that it is difficult to measure the output of workers
directly. Freeman (1977) and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) provide an explanation
for wage growth based upon an insurance motive. Harris and Holmstr assume
that workers are equally productive in all firms, mobility costs are zero, and
the productivity of a given worker In future periods is uncertain. They show
that firms will insure workers against low productivity outcomes later in their
careers. The expected value of the wage in later periods exceeds the expected
value of marginal product, and this gap is financed by an excess of expected
marginal product over wages in early periods. Guasch and Weiss (1980, 1982)
present an adverse selection model of wage growth. They assume that individuals
The evidence that wages rise with tenure isimportant in implicit contracts
models of wages and employment. As Grossman (1977) pointed out and Rosen
(1984) emphasizes in a recent survey article, contracts which insure workers
against adverse swings in demand are feasible only if the worker cannot easily
break the contract when conditions improve. The returns to the firm and the
worker from shared investments in specific human capital would provide both
parties with an incentive to maintain the job match despite fluctuations in
marginal product and the alternative wage relative to the contract wage. It
is clear from Hall(1982) and Mincer and JovanovIc (1981) that many workers end
up in jobs which last for a long period of time. It is unclear whether this
is due to a sharing in the rents from a good job match (see Jovanovic ,1979),
a sharing in the returns from job specific training, or other barriers to
quits and layoffs.—3—
know more about their ability than do firms at the time thatthey are hired, and
productivity is costly to observe. They show that in equilibrium firmsmay
offer wages below marginal product in the initialperiod, during which workers
are evaluated (at a cost), and a wage above marginal product in subsequent
periods to those who meet a performance standard. The wage structureserves to
discourage workers who know that they are relatively unproductive from
applying .
Althoughdiscussion of the link between these alternatives to the human
capital model and empirical evidence have focussed on studies relatingwages to
total labor market experience, such as Mincer (1974), for themost part they
offer an explanation for the partial effect of tenureon wages when experience
is controlled for, rather than for the partial effect of totalexperience when
tenure is controlled for. For example, within Lazear'ssupervision model firms
should pay newly hired workers who have changed jobs afteraccumulating tenure
in another firm a wage that is closer to that fornew entrants. In Harris and
Holmstrom's model, firms have no incentive to honor thewage guarantee the
worker had with another firm if the worker's productivity(the same in all
firms) turns out to be below the guarantee level. Startingwages may rise with
prior experience, but only because the decline in the number ofyears until
retirement and the decline in the residual uncertainty about the worker's
productivity imply that the amount of insurance that the worker "buys" in the
initial years on a job falls with experience. Presumably, this effectis
small. The upshot is that the empirical basis for these modelsas important
1See also the related adverseselection models of Salop and Salop (1976) and
Nickel! (1976), in which the increase ofwages with time on the job serves as a
means of sorting out workers with a high propensity to quit. Parsons(1984)
provides an excellent survey of the rapidly growing theoretical literatureon
of wage growth. Notethat all three of the theories mentioned predict a
decline in quits with tenure, as wages available in the firmrise above those
available outside of the firm.—4--
explanations of earnings patterns over the lifecycle restsheavily on the
evidence that tenure has a substantial effect on wages.*Thus, a careful re-
examination of whether wages do in fact rise with job tenure complements recent
efforts by Medoff and Abraham(1980, 1981), Brown (1983), Mincer(1984) and others
(see the conclusion) to provide more direct tests of the human capital model
against alternatives which do not Imply an increase in productivity with
experience.
In summary, job tenure is a key variable in models of earnings
determination. However, the studies of growth of wages with seniority have been
accompanied by widespread recognition that unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals and across job matches may produce large biases In estimates of the
effect of tenure on wages as well as turnover. (See for example, Mincer and
Jovanovic (1981), and Heckman (1981)). Indeed, the job matching models of
Jovanovic (1979) and Johnson (1978) have stimulated a growing theoretical
literature in which job match heterogeneity plays a central role in both
turnover and wage growth.* Since tenure is a simple function of past quit and
layoff decisions,**it will be positively correlated with characteristics of
individuals or of jobs which lead to lower quits and layoffs. These same
characteristics are likely to be positively related to worker productivity and,
*
Humancapital theory and the other models mentioned are contributions to
the search for a sound economic theory for why older workers are paid more
than younger workers. The notion that they are paid more for cultural reasons
would be particularly difficult to square with a finding that most of the
increase is due to general labor market experience rather than tenure.
Provided workers stay in the same job, the nonnegative profit condition does
not tightly constrain the experience profile of wages. With mobility, it
difficult to understand why firms are willing to pay a large experience
premium to newly hired older workers (as the data indicate they routinely
if older workers are not more productive than younger workers.
Flinn (1982) implements the Jovanovic model for a sample of young men and
finds that job match heterogeneity plays an important role in wage growth and
mobility during first few years of work experience.
**See equation (2) below.—5—
in a competitive labor market, to wages.
The chief contribution of this paper is the development andimplementation
of a simple instrumental variables scheme for dealing with theproblem of
"heterogeneity bias" in analysis of the effects of tenure onwages. We use the
variation of tenure over a given job match (along with the levels of theother
variables which appear in the wage equation) to form an instrument fortenure.
The variation In tenure over the job, in contrast to the variationin tenure
across individuals and jobs, is uncorrelated with the fixed individual andjob
match components of the error term of thewage model. The methodology is
inspired in part by Hausman and Taylor's (1981) treatment of analysis of
covariance models in an instrumental variables framework. Theapproach is
implemented for a sample of male heads of household from the PanelStudy of
Income Dynamics.
We also experiment with an error components type GLS version of the
instrumental variables procedure to account for correlation in thewage errors
for each person arising from the individual specific andjob match specific
component of the wage error. Use of the GLS versions of the instrumental
variables and least squares procedures is complicated by the fact that the
sample is unbalanced, with a large variation in the number ofyears of data on
each individual and on each job match, and to our knowledge hasnever been
implemented in such a situation. A secondary contribution of thepaper is the
derivation (in Appendix 1) of a simple formula tocompute these estimators in
the case of unbalanced data.
Our main finding Is that the effect of seniority onwages (with the effects
of general labor market experience and secularwage growth held constant) is
small. The estimates from the instrumental variablesprocedure indicate that
the first year of tenure raises wages by about 5 %, but additionalyears of—6—
tenure years of tenure contribute little to wage growth. The co.€ficient on the
linear tenure term is actually slightly negative and the overall effect of the
first 10 years of job tenure is to raise wages by only 3%. In contrast, general
labor market experience results in a wage increase of 32% over the first 10
years and 87% over the first 30 years. It accounts for thelion's share of wage
growth during a career,' although these estimates combine the wage effects of
experience arising from general skill accumulation, which are stressed in human
capital theory, and the wage increases due to labor market search, which are
stressed in search and job matching models. The instrumental variables
estimates of the tenure profile of wages are much flatter and the experience
slopes are steeper than estimates based upon least squares or upon use of an
index of prior job separations to control for individual heterogeneity.
Unfortunately, the Instrumental variables estimates of the tenure slope are
probably biased downward by job heterogeneity despite the fact that variance of
tenure within a job is uncorrelated with the permanent component of the job
match. As is explained below, the bias arises indirectly through the
correlation of the job match component with labor market experience. Biases may
also arise from measurement error in the tenure variable. Much of the empirical
analysis is devoted to assessing the importance of these biases. We show that
they are probably small.
We also present separate estimates for union and nonunion workers and for
blacks as well as whites. Union—nonunion differences in the tenure profile of
wages are dramatically reduced when heterogeneity is accounted for. Finally, we
provide evidence that both the individual specific and match specific error
components of the wage have negative associations with quits, layoffs and
A time trend is used to control for secular growth in the economy, which
is also an important factor in wage growth over the life of a worker.—7—
separations, which tends to confirm a role for heterogeneity bias in least
squares estimates of the wage equation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the econometric
methodology. Section 4 (and Appendix 2) discusses the data. Section 5 presents
the empirical analysis. The concluding section suniniarizes the results and their
implications for models of wage growth and turnover over the work life, and
provides an agenda for research. We begin with a brief review of why tenure is
endogenous in the wage equation.
2.THE KNDOZNEITY OF ThNURE IN THE WAGE EQUATION
Assume that the wage of individual iwhois job jin period t is determined
by the following equation.
(1) Wjj(t)tb0x1 j(t)t + f( Tjj(t)t ) +
The variable Wjj(t)t is the log of the real wage,Xij(t)t is a vector
characteristics of the person and the job and includes labor market experience,
Tjj(t)t is the number of years of person i has held job j as of time t, the
function f(.) is the tenure profile of wages, andcij(t)t is the error term.
In general, Cij(t)t may consist of serially correlated components that are
specific to worker i, job j(*')and the match between I and j(t).** The fact that
worker i may change jobs during the sample period has been made explicit by
writing the job subscript as j(t). For notational convenience we will often
refer to j(t) simply as j.
Least squares estimates of the tenure profile will be biased upward if
is positively correlated withEijt. To see that this is likely to be the case,
**Withoutobservations on several individuals in a given firm, it is not
possible to decompose the job effects into firm effects (received by all
workers in the firm) and job match effects. Below we use the term job match
to refer to the sum of these separate effects.—8—
consider the following simple model for TjjtOne may show that Tjjt is related




where the quit indicator is 1 if the individual quit in period k and 0
otherwise, the layoff indicator Lik is 1 if the individual was laid off In
period k and 0 otherwise, and EXPIt is the labor market experience of person i
In t.Workersquit if their best alternative is more valuable (In an
intertemporal sense) than their present job given the option of future quits and
expectations about future wages, nonpecuniary characteristics, mobility costs,
and layoff behavior. Firms base layoff decisions upon a comparison of current
and expected future wages to the current and future productivity of the worker
plus the direct and indirect costs of terminating the him, given that the firm
has the option of laying off the worker in the future and the worker has the
option of quitting. We avoid detailed structural models of these decisions
since they are not essential to our purposes and simply express the relationship
between the arguments of the wage equation and and 4k as follows.
(3) Qik =If UIj(k)k =B0Xjj(k)k +g(Tj(k)k)+Ujj(k)k< 0
0 otherwise
(4) Lik =1if Vjj(k)k =00Xij(k)k +G(Tjj(k)k)+Vjj(k)k< 0
=0 otherwise
Ujj(k)k is the worker's valuation of job j(k) in period k relative to the
worker's best alternative In k net of moving costs. The composite error
component ulj(k)k is a function of the unobserved characteristics of the
individual, the job match and the worker's best alternative in period k.—9-.
Vjj(k)k is the firm's valuation of the option of keeping the worker. It depends
on the composite error component
vij(k)k.
Equations (2), (3) and (4) together imply thatTijt depends upon the
distribution of past values of the quit and layoff errorcomponents 1j(k)k and
Vij(k)k and thus will be endogenous in the wage equation if these values are
correlated with the wage error This is likely to be the case for a number
of reasons.:
i) Unmeasured individual differences in the quit propensity (due, for
example, to differences across workers in the value of nonmarket time relative
to the mean of their wage profile or to differences in drive andperseverance)
are likely to be negatively correlated with the individual specificcomponent in
the wage equation. One would also expect low (high) productivity workersboh to receive lower (higher) wages and to be more (less) susceptible tolayoffs
ii) Individual differences in the value of leisure time are likely to be
positively associated with quit rates into unemployment or out of the labor
force. They are likely to be negatively related to productivity(through effort
on the job and absenteeism) and wage rates.
iii) Optimal selection of jobs by workers in the presence of firmspecific
and match specific error components in thewage function will result in
biases. Jovanovic (1979) argues that differences in thecomplementarity of the
skills of workers with the requirements of particular jobs whichare observable
only through experience on the job results in substantial variation in the
productivity and wages of workers across jobs. Noncompetitive elements in the
wage structure or differences across firms in the optimal compensation policy
(arising from differences in hiring costs, supervision costs, and other factors
(see Pencavel (1972)) may also mean that workers face a distribution ofwages
for their skills. Workers who receive highwages relative to their alternatives
will not quit, inducing a positive correlation between tenure andwages in a
cross—section (see Jovanovic (1979)). Match heterogeneity in the layoff
probability is also likely to be associated with match heterogeneity in thewage
equation. On the other hand, workers willquit to take an alternative job if
and only if the alternatives are sufficiently high tocompensate for the effect
*Thiswould be the case if total compensation, includingwages and fringe
benefitsj does not vary one for one with productivity within a particular class
of jobs.
Although we expect this to result in an overstatement of the tenure
profile due to unmeasured productivity differences, workers with a given set
of skills who enter job matches with high layoff probabilitiesmight be
expected to receive a compensating differential for layoff risk,especially in
the presence of moving costs. This would tend to bias downward the estimates
of the tenure slope. Note that the formal matching models suchas
Jovanovic(1.979a) do not distinguish between layoffs and quits.—10—
on wages of lost tenure. This results in a downward bias in the estimated wage—
tenure profile. Use of a fixed effects or first differencing procedure to
control for individual heterogeneity may amplify this downward bias, since with
such a procedure changes in tenure associated with job changes identify the
effect of tenure on wages.
Alternative means of dealing with these problems include the use of
information on prior mobility as a control for individual heterogeneity (Mincer
and Jovanovic (1981)), instrumental variables techniques, procedures to correct
for sample selection (Borjas and Rosen (1981)), fixed effects procedures (Cline
(1979a) and differencing (Bartel and Borjas (1981)). None of the earlier
studies has simultaneously dealt with both individual heterogeneity and job
heterogeneity. Ultimately, a joint analysis of quits, layoffs and wages rates
which allows for both individual heterogeneity and job heterogeneity would be
the most satisfactory way to deal with the endogeneity of tenure in the wage
equation. However, there are many obstacles to such an analysis, including the
lack of an accepted model of layoffs, and the econometric difficulties of
estimating models based upon (3) and (4) once individual heterogeneity and job
heterogeneity are admitted. For this reason, we focus upon single equation
estimators for the wage equation.
3.USEOFVARIATION IN TENURE WITHINTHE JOB AS AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE
We address the problems of both individual and job heterogeneity in the
wage equation using an instrumental variables estimator, which we refer to as
1V1. The principal instrumental variable for tenure is the deviation of tenure
around its mean for the sample observations on a given job match. The appeal of
this variable is that it is uncorrelated by construction with both the
individual specific error component of the wage equation and with the permanent
job match component.
The details of the procedure and its formal justification are as follows.—11—
It is always possible to decompose wage error term into the sum of a fixed
individual effect Cj, a fixed job match component€ij(t), and a transitory
disturbance which may or may not be serially correlated, so that
CutCi + Cij(t) + ujt
One may decompose the transitory componentit as
nut —Uit+ Uijt + Ut
where u1 is an individual specific transitory error component that is
uncorrelated across individuals,Ui. is a transitory match component that is
uncorrelated with Uj, and u is an economy wide wage disturbance. The
individual specific component uj and the general time componentu may be
freely correlated over time. However, we assume that the transitory match
component is serially uncorrelated and/or has a small variance, an
assumption which we will discuss below. After substituting for and writing
the tenure profile f(Tij) as the sum of terms involvingTijt, Tit2 and a dummy
variable for tenure greater than 1, the wage equation (1) may be rewritten as
(5) =
boXijt+ biTit + b2Tijt2 + b30LDJOBijt + Ci +Cij(t) + Ul + Uj +
where OLDJOBiJt is 1 if Tijt > 1 and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on
0LDJ0BIt
permits the first year on the job to have special importance. The variable
would be expected to have a positive coefficient if specific capital investments
associated with orientation and hiring are large and a substantial amount of
information on the quality of the job match is revealed in the initial months on
the job, or if investment in job specific skills is especially rapid at the
beginning of a job. A large positive coefficient would also be consistent with
Guasch and Weiss's emphasis on testing during the early months on the job.
Let Tij(t) be the mean of tenure for individual I over the sample—12—
observations on the individual I in job j, where the fact that the job may
change is again made explicit by writing j as a function of t. For example, if
a person has been in a job for 3 years when the person enters the survey
(t1968) and remains on the job for 3 more years, then Tjj(t) =[3+4+5+6]/4as t
ranges from 1968 to 1971.
Define Tit to be the deviation of Tjt from the job mean, with Tt =Tjjt
—Tij(t).
We now consider whether Tit Is a valid instrumental variable for
Note that Tjt sums to 0 over the sample years in which the person is in
job j. Consequently, It is orthogonal by construction to the error components
£1 and ij(t), which are constant during job j and which embody permanent
individual and job heterogeneity.That is, Tjjt is unrelated to permanent
heterogeneity across individuals and across job matches in the determinants of
wage rates. If the transitory component is serially uncorrelated, then it
will have only a weak relationship to Tjjt and since Tjjt depends upon
past quit and layoff decisions, and a wage disturbance lasting only one period
should have little weight in a mobility decision. Serial correlation in the
individual specific and labor market wide subcomponents u and should not
pose a problem either, since in this case the resulting variation in the
composite error will not be related to movements in T1 around its mean
for a given job match. It follows that Tt is a valid instrumental variable
for Tj as well as T2j and OLDJOB1. Basically, the tenure coefficients are
estimated from the growth of tenure within each job. The same argument




as instrumental variables&. Note that this approach avoids bias in
the tenure coefficients due to match heterogeneity, which would remain even
&The other variables in the wage equation are also used as instrumental
variables.—13—
after removal of individual effects.
It is natural to compare the 1V1 estimator to estimation using a fixed
effect for each job match. This is equivalent to regressing the deviation of
from the sample mean for job match ij on the deviations of the right hand
side variables from their means for the match. The fixed job match effects
estimator removes bias due to presence of and cj(t). However, this is not
feasible because the deviations from means of tenure and experience are
perfectly correlated. Both advance by one each year during the course of a
job. Consequently, the tenure and experience coefficients are not separately
identified.
3.1 Potential Sources of Bias in the 1V1 Estimates
In this section we discuss problems which may arise if (1) experience is
correlated with cjj(t) (2) tenure is measured with error, (3) the tenure slope
varies across people and job matches, or (4) the assumption that the transitory
part (ujjt) of the match specific component of wages is serial uncorrelated or
has a small variance is false.
Unfortunately, the fact that Tijt Ti2. and OLDJOBIt are uncorrelated
with is not sufficient to guarantee the consistency of the estimates of the
tenure slopes given the presence of other variables in the model. Labor market
experience will be correlated with cl(). As a result, the 1V1 estimates of
the experience slope of wages, as well as least squares estimates, combine the
Our approach should be applicable to other problems in addition to the
estimation of wage functions. One example is the analysis of the effects of
time in residence and age of structure on the rental price of housing. The
estimator falls within the general class of estimators considered by Hausman
and Taylor (1981). They show how to estimate variance components models with
endogenous time invariant right hand side variables using 1) exogenous time
invariant right hand side variables and 2) the means and deviations from time
means of exogenous time varying right hand side variables as instrumental
variables. Note that they use their procedure to solve an identification
problem which arises (in estimating the effects of schooling on wages) with a
fixed effects approach.—14—
effects of general skill accumulation on wages as well as the average change
with time in the mean of ij(t) Jovanovic's(1979) job matching model and more
conventional search models (eg. Burdett(1978)) imply that Cjj(t) is likely to be
positively correlated with time in the labor market, since more experienced
workers have had more time to locate and move to good jobs.* This positive
effect is probably offset to some extent by the fact that a substantial fraction
of job changes are layoffs (about 40% in our sample) or are motivated by
nonpecuniary considerations and thus are not the response of workers to an offer
of a job with a better match component in the wage. Nevertheless, the
instrumental variables estimate of the coefficient on experience is likely to be
upward biased as an estimate of the partial effect of experience (with Eij(t)
held constant) on wages. Unfortunately, the upward bias in experience is likely
to induce a downward bias in the estimates of the tenure slope, since Eij(t)
does not in fact increase unless the job changes.** The downward bias arises as
a partial correction for the overstatement of the effects of additional labor
market experience on wages during years in which the job remains the same.
*
Much of the rise in wages with experience that is associated with moves
through a sequence of jobs during a career is best interpreted as accumulation
of general human capital rather than information on comparative advantage
across jobs. A job may provide (worker financed) training that is more useful
in a wide variety of alternative jobs than in the present job. See Rosen
972). Apprenticeships are an extreme example of this phenomena.
Onemighthypothesis that total labor market experience will be correlated
with if fixed individual characteristics which are negatively related to
productivity are positively related to the amount of time persons spend out of
the labor force or unemployed. We checked this possibility using the IV
procedure by treating the terms involving experience (EXP, EXP2, EXP2 an
EXPEDUC in Table 1) as endogenous variables along with the tenure variables
in the wage equations and substituting (age —education+ 5)education and a
cubic in (age —education+ 5) for the
variables involving experience in the first stage equations. The results are
very similar to the 1V1 estimates reported in the table. We feel safe in
ignoring possible bias in the coefficient on union status, health status, and
other control variables in the wage equatiqn arisin from c becuse these
variables are approximately orthogonal to T1t 'ijt2'
and OLDJOBi.t and
are also only weakly related to experience.—15—
present evidence on the quantitative significance of the problem in Sections 5.4
and 5.5 below.
A second potential problem with the 1V1 concerns measurement error in the
tenure variable. For the years prior to 1975 the tenure measure is bracketed.
Also, since employer tenure is not asked in all years, It has been necessary to
interpolate between some years using information on employer tenure for other
years, reasons for job changes, evidence of changes of industry, and other
variables. (See AppendIx 2.) The resulting measurement error in the tenure
variables is likely to bias downward both the least squares and the 1V1
estimates of the tenure profile. But the bias is likely to be more severe In
the case of the 1V1 procedure, since removal of Tjj(t) in the construction of
Tjjt will amplify the relative importance of measurement error in the total
variance of the instrument for Tjt used to estimate the wage equation.#
Sections 5.4 and 5.6 present evidence on the size of the bias from measurement
error.
Thus far the discussion has Ignored the possibility that the tenure profile
of wages varies across people and jobs. Such variation might arise from
differences in the amount of worker financed specific human capital which is
appropriate given the characteristics of the job and the individual (See Borjas
(1981) and Jovanovic (1979b)). This would add the component b1 Tijt to the
error term of the wage equation, where bi is the deviation of the tenure slope
for the match ij around b1, and b1 is redefined as the mean of the tenure slope
b1 over all job matches weighted by their relative frequency and duration (i.e.,
This discussion assumes that the measurement error is not strongly
serially correlated. Error in the level of tenure which is consistent from
yearto year within each job match will have little effect on the 1V1 and GLS—
1V1estimates and a potentially strong (negative) effect on the OLS
estimates. See Griliches (1984) for a recent survey on measurement error and
other data problems.—16—
the tenure slope of an observation chosen at random from the sample.) One would
expect the level of tenure to be correlated with as workers in jobs which
are suitable for large specific investments are more likely to stay in those
jobs. Thus, if one estimates by OLS and ignores this component, the result Is a
biased estimate of the mean of the tenure slope. Unfortunately, one may show
that the 1V1 estimate of the mean tenure slope is also likely to be upward
biased.* We have not investigated remedies for this problem, in part because
the very modest estimates of tenure slope based upon the 1V1 procedure indicate
that the upward bias is not quantitatively important.
Finally, we discuss the assumption (pg. 11) of no serial correlation in
There is reason to believe that some serial correlation will be
present. For example, wages may vary with firm specific changes in product
demand (especially with monopolistic competition in the product market) or
production technology. Or serially correlated industry—wide productivity shocks
may not affect the wages of workers in their present job (because of implicit
contracts which smooth wages) but may alter the wages available to them
*Inthe simplified case in which Tjt is the only variable which enters the
wage equation, one may show that the estimate of b1 is equal to b1 plus
Z a1b1, where the summation is over ij pairs, the weights a1 are
proportional to 1j(t)t' and the latter summation is over the values of t
corresponding to the job match ij in the sample. One may show that Tjj(t)t is
approximately equal to (l112)(n11—l)3 + (lI4)(ni_l)2+(l/6)(njj_l) where n1j
is the number of sample observatons corresponding to match ij. Thus, the
weight a1 on the tenure parameter specific to match ij rises faster than the
number of observations corresponding to lj. Since n1j is positively related to
the duration of the job, and since almost any reasonable model of quits
implies (ceteris paribus) that jobs with steeper tenure slopes have lower quit
rates, we conclude that the estimate of b1 is biased upward as an estimate of
the tenure slope for an observation chosen at random from the sample. (The
expression for ETIj(t)t Is not exact because the starting date for jobs need
not correspond exactly to the time of the survey, and because the time between
surveys is not exactly one year. In deriving the above expressions one uses
the facts that
k=n(n+l)/2and k2 =n(n+l)(2n+l)/6
forany positive integer n.)—17—
elsewhere .Adecline in increases the probability that the worker will
find a better alternative and quit, although the effect of a given change in
on the worker's valuation of his job is small unless has a strong
positive correlation. To see the implications of this for the estimate of the
tenure profile, note first that the size of the decline in necessary to
trigger a quit (for any given value of the alternative offer received) increases
with Tjjt if wages rise with This implies that the expected value of
conditional on continuation of the job declines with Tijt. Consequently, over
the course of the job (i.e., conditional on no quit) Tjjt is negatively
correlated with the conditional expectation of Least squares estimates
(with or without controls for individual heterogeneity) of the tenure slope will
be downward biased. Part of this correlation will carry over to Tjjt and bias
downward the instrumental variables estimates of the tenure slope. On the other
hand, a similar argument suggests that selection due to layoffs is likely to
produce bias in the other direction, and so the two effects are partially
offsetting. An analysis of the residuals does not provide evidence of strong
positive autocorrelation in the residuals once individual and job effects have
been taken into account, although it should be kept in mind that the residuals
are affected by the selection process.& While there is no strong theoretical or
However, Altonji, Mincer and Shakotko (1984, ch. 4) find only minor
differences by tenure level in the effect of the aggregate unemployment rate,
state employment changes, or county unemployment rates on wages.
The autocovariance function of residuals for the same individual across
years in which the job is not the same is
Lag: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Covar: .110 .085 .079 .074 .074 .072 .071 .069 .061 .069.067 .083
Ignoring an unimportant economy wide error component, the covariance at each lag
is an estimate of var(c) + cov(iit,u.r_k) for k > 0. The autocovariance
function of residuals for the same in{vidual over years on the same job is
Lag: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Covar: .110 .101 .094 .092 .090 .090 .088 .091 .093 .090 .085 .072
This provides an estimate of var(c1) + var(c.) + cov(uit,u.t_k) +
cov(uj,ujt_k) for k > 0. Comparison oft?ie patterns of àecay of the two—18—
empirical presumption that this bias is important, further analysis is needed.
3.2 Treatment of Correlation of Errors Across Individuals and Jobs
Even if one assumes that ij is serially uncorrelated, the composite error
term of the model is correlated over time as a result of the individual
component and the job match components. Consequently, the 1111 procedure is
inefficient relative to a GLS (generalized least squares) version of the
procedure. The same limitations apply to the OLS estimates of the model. Use
of the GLS versions of the IV and OLS procedures is complicated by the fact
that the sample is unbalanced, with a large variation in the number of years of
data on each individual and on each job match, and to our knowledge GLS has
never been implemented in such a situation.The necessary formulae to compute
GLS versions of the least squares and 1V1 procedures for the case of unbalanced
data are derived in Appendix
covariance functions provides information on cov(uit,ujJt_k), which plays a
role only in the covariance of residuals over the same job.In making the
comparison, one should keep in mind that the covariance of residuals across
different jobs is overstated at lag 1 because the hourly wage variable is an
average over the calendar year, and may combine information on the two jobs.
Thus, the drop in the covariance between the first and second lags (.110 to
.085) is overstated. The fact that the patterns of decay in the two
autocovariance functions are very similar after the first lag suggests that
is either white noise, a random walk, or has a very small variance. A
regression analysis of squared residuals from wage equations in columns 3, 6, 9,
and 12 of Table 1 indicates that if anything the error variance actually falls
somewhat with tenure, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that is a
random walk. Thus, subject to the important caveat that the residuals
themselves are affected by the job selection process discussed in the text, we
find little evidence that uj plays an important of a role in the evolution of
ages.The key to computation of the GLS versions of the least squares and 1V1
estimators is the analytical formula for the inverse of the covariance matrix
of the wage errors for each individual in the sample, which we have derived
under the assumption that is serially uncorrelated over time and across
people. This inverse is a function of the number of observations on the
individual in the sample, the number of jobs held, the number of years in each
of the jobs, the covariances of the across time periods on the same job
and across different jobs for the same individual, and the variance of
Given the formula for the inverse of the covariance matrix, computation o the
GLS versions of the least squares and 1V1 procedures is straightforward. We
have ignored the effect of the common error component u on covariance—19—
In interpreting the GLS results below, readers should keep in mind that the
standard justification for use of GLS is to improve efficiency and provide
asymptotically valid standard errors rather than to reduce bias in the
estimates. Since the calculated standard errors of the OLS estimates are very
small (and are not likely to be understated by a large amount), large changes in
the OLS results are not expected unless the wage model is misspecified. If the
failure to control for heterogeneity is an important misspecification, then
there is reason to expect substantial differences between the OLS and GLS
estimates. To see this, note that when the instruments are not used in place of
the tenure measures, the GLS estimator may be thought of as least squares
applied to the wage model after subtracting from each of the variables in the
equation: (1) a weighting factor times the average value of the variable for the
sample years in which the person is in a given job, and (2) a second weight
times the individual specific mean of the variable. The weighting factors
depend in a complicated way upon the covariances mentioned above, the length of
the job, the number of jobs held by the individual, and the number of years that
the person is in the sample. Thus the GLS procedure uses less of the variation
in the data across individuals and across jobs than does OLS. It is
intermediate between use of an individual or job fixed effects procedure and
OLS.* Consequently, the GLS estimates of the model may differ sharply from the
OLS estimates if heterogeneity produces important biases in the OLS results. At
the same time, one would expect the 1V1 and 1V1—GLS to give similar answers,
structure given that a time trend is added to the model and year dummies
xplain very little of the wage variance.
We were unable to derive an explicit formula relating the GLS procedure to
these procedures. Our argument is by analogy to Maddala (1971), who provides
an exact formula relating the GLS estimator to the OLS and fixed effect
estimators for case of a fixed individual specific error component that is
uncorrelated across people and a person specific serially uncorrelated
transitory component, and the same number of observations per person.—20—
since the 1V1 procedure is not sensitive to individual heterogeneity or job
heterogeneity. The bottom line of this discussion is that we use the GLS
versionof the various estimators both to provide an informal specification test
for heterogeneity bias and to improve efficiency.
4.TA
Thesample is based upon the 1968—1981 waves of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. Most of the results below are for white male heads of households,
although some findings for a corresponding sample of blacks are also
presented. For a given year the sample contains individuals who were between
the ages 18—60 iclusive, who were employed, temporarily laid off, or unemployed
at the time of the survey, and who were not retired, permanently disabled, self
employed, employed by the government in the current or past year, or from Alaska
orHawaii. Observations with missing data on the variables in wage equation are
excluded for the particular sample year. The effective sample for whites covers
the calendar years 1968—1980 and contains 15138 observations m 2163 individuals
and 4334 job matches.
Most of the variables are standard. However, it is important to point out
that there are ambiguities in the quit and job tenure measures, especially in
the early years of the sample. This is because the questions about job changes
in the early years do not distinguish clearly between promotions and quits, the
tenure variable is bracketed in the early years, and in some years the tenure
variable does not distinguish clearly between tenure with an employer and tenure
in a position. We have used a number of cross checks to try to solve these
problems, but some measurement error undoubtedly remains. The possibility that
measurement error in the tenure variables has a serious effect on the results is
investigated (and rejected) in Section 5.4 below.—21—
The real wage measure is the log of labor earnings during the year divided
by annual hours and is converted to real terms using the GNP implicit price
deflator for consumption. The variables T, T2 and OLDJOB and union status refer
to the time of the survey in the corresponding year (typically in March or
April). The variable N/EXP is a measure of the number of jobs held by an
individual up to the current year (N) divided by labor market experience (EXP).
Table A.l presents descriptive statistics on most of the variables used in the
analysis. Appendix 2 provides additional discussion of the data.
5. RESULTS
The results are organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents the least
*Sincethe earnings and hours questions refer to the previous calendar year,
this data was matched to information on union status and tenure from the prior
survey. The quit, layoff, and separation indicators refer to the 12 months
prior to the current survey and are matched to data on union status and tenure
om the previous survey.
Note that for those who change jobs during the year the wage is presumably
an average of the wage on each of the jobs weighted by the portion of the year
spent in each. Thus, use tenure at the time of the survey rather than the
average of tenure over the calendar year may lead to an understatement of the
effect of the first year of tenure on wages. One alternative is to construct
a weighted average from tenure in adjacent survey years. Preliminary analysis
using such a measure lead to results very similar to those reported below.
The second alternative is to use the reported hourly wage for the job held at
the time of the survey as the wage measure. The main disadvantages of this
variable are (1) it only available for hourly workers prior to tFE 1976 survey
(2) it is truncated at $9.98 prior to 1978, and (3) it underestimates wage
growth to the extent that paid vacations and holidays rise with tenure and
experience. The truncation of the data and the fact that the mean of the
average hourly earnings of hourly workers is 25.7% below the corresponding
figure for salary workers will bias to some extent the experience and tenure
coefficients. When these factors are taken into account the results using the
reported wage are very similar to those using the average hourly wage. For
example, when the sample is restricted to the years 1978—1981 (when neither of
the first two problems are present), the parameter estimates (with uncorrected
standard errors) corresponding to column 6 of Table 1 are
W =—.0012T + .00021 T2 +.0363OLDJOB + .0393 EXP —.0140 EXP2/10
(.011) (.0005) (.0273) (.0096) (.004)
+.0013 EXP3/100 + .0005 EDIJCEXP+ othervariables.
(.005) (.0003)—22—
squares and 1V1 estimates of the wage equation for white males. Section 5.2
examines whether both individual heterogeneity and job heterogeneity are
present. Section 5.3 discusses the GLS versions of the least squares and IV
estimators. Section 5.4 compares the OLS and IV methods from the standpoint of
predictive accuracy. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 assessApossibility of biases in our
estimates. Section 5.7 compares results for blacks and whites and union and
nonunion workers. Section 5.8 shows that both and have a strong
positive association with the quit and separation probabilities. Our main
conclusion is that job tenure plays only a small role in the wage equation, and
that heterogeneity bias dominates the cross—sectional relationship between
tenure and wages.
5.1 Basic OLS and 1V1 Estimates of the Wage Equation for White Males
Table 1 reports various estimates of the coefficients on years of
education, experience, and tenure. To reduce the possibility of bias in the
tenure and experience profiles from an overly restrictive specification of the
education—experience polynomial, we include education, educatkn2, EXP, EXP2,
and EXP3, and the product of education and EXP. The equations also contain
controls for marital status, union membership, health status, city size and
residence in an SMSA, time, and region, although the parameter estimates for
these variables are not displayed.* Most previous studies have used either T or
T and T2 as the specification of the tenure profile. We report results for
these specifications but focus the discussion on the results with T, T2 and the
dummy variable OLDJOB, 7sdefined to be 1 If T > 1 and 0 otherwise, all
included in the equation.
The OLS estimates (columns 1—3) and the 1V1 es timates (columns 4—6) of the
*
Thefull set of estimates for columns 3 and 6 of Tab 1 and columns 3 and 6
of Table 2 are reported in Table A3.—23—
wage parameters tell very different stories about the tenure profile of
vages.* The OLS estimates indicate that OLDJOB has a large positive effect on
wages, with a point estimate of .111 (Col. 3) and a standard error of .012. In
contrast, the 1V1 estimate of the OLDJOB coefficient is only .050 with a
standard error of .009. The 1V1 coefficient estimates for T and T2 are —.0041
and .002 with small standard errors. (See col. 6; note that T has a
coefficient of .0016 with a t—value of 1.14 when It is entered by itself.) The
corresponding OLS estimates are .0178 and —.0003 with tiny standard errors.
In general, the OLS estimates are typical of those obtained from cross
sectional analyses of the wage equation. They Indicate a substantial growth of
wages with tenure, with much of the growth occurring in the first year on the
job. By constrast, the 1V1 estimates indicate substantially smaller first year
growth and a virtually flat tenure profile thereafter. The relationship between
tenure and wages is usefully summarized by calculating the effect of the first
10 years of tenure on the wage. This Is reported at the bottom of the columns
of Table 1. The 1111 e timates Imply that the accumulation of the first 10 years
of tenure (including the first year effect) results in a wage increase of .0268
(with a standard error of .016). Since the wage is in logs this corresponds to
a percentage increase of 2.7%. This is only 1/11th of the corresponding OLS
estimate of the contribution of 10 years of tenure to wages (30%). These
results indicate that the strong correlation between wages and tenure observed
in previous studies is primarily due to heterogeneity bias. Evidently, the
permanent individual component of wages is positively correlated with the
*
Thefirst stage equation for the tenure variables are reported in Table
A2,columns 1—3. The standard errors in Tables 1, 5 and 6 have been corrected
for the effects of correlation across observations on the same individual and
on the same job match arising from the error components c and Ejj().TheY are
asymptotically correct under the assumption that is serially
uncorrelated.—24—
propensity to quit or suffer layoffs, and/or individuals who enter into job
matches which are at the low end of the wage distribution (for the individual)
quickly move on to other positions. The findings are consistent with
Jovanovic's matching model as well as with a potentially large role for
individual heterogeneity.
Accompanying the much smaller lV1 as timates of the tenure slope is an
increase in the estimated experience profile. This is expected since the strong
positive correlation between experience and tenure implies that the upward bias
in the tenure profile resulting from heterogeneity will result in a downward
bias in the experience profile. The OLS estimates indicate that total labor
market experience raises wages by 31.7% during the first ten years of work and
48.2% during the first 30 years. (Note that these estimates are very precise.)
The corresponding figures based upon the 1V1 estimates are 53.7% and 86.6%.
Since the tenure effects on wages must be multiplied by approximately .25 or .3
(the derivative of the mean of tenure with respect to experience) to estima
the contribution of tenure to growth in wages over a career, the 1V1 estimates
indicate that the role of tenure is trivial relative to labor market experience
in explaining the gross increase in wages with labor market experience.
It is useful to compare the 1V1 results with those based upon the addition
of N/EXP, the ratio of prior separations to experience, to the wage equation as
a control for individual heterogeneity. The results for this approach to the
problem of heterogeneity bias, which is due to Mincer and Jovanovic (1981), are
reported in columns 10—13 and are similar to the OLS results discussed above.*
*C columns 10—12 with 1—3. The variable makes less of difference in our
results than in Mincer and Jovanovic's, who used th 1976 panel from the PSID,
measureas the number of separations between 1968 and 1975, and work with N
directly or with the product of N and experience. This is not surprising,
since the link between curren.t tenure and number of separations in the
previous 8 years is closer to being definitional than the link between tenure
and our estimates of the total number of prior separations divided by—25—
The estimated tenure profile over the first 10 years is about 10 times steeper
than that using 1V1. The prior separation index does not appear to be an
adequate control for heterogeneity bias. One possible reason is that N/EXP
variable does not control for job match heterogeneity. A second reason is that
N/EXP the variable is a noisy control for individual heterogeneity. In part,
this may be due to problems with the measure of N, and in part it is due to the
fact that for any given true separation probability the observed separation rate
has a considerable variance when EXP is low. The noise in NIEXP may have a
complicated effect on the results because of the presence of EXP, EXP2 and EXP3
in the model and the fact that EXP is correlated with T.
5.2 Extensions: Individual Heterogeneity Versus Job Heterogeneity
An interesting alternative estimator is obtained by adding the deviation of
Tij(t) from the individual mean to the list of instrumental variables
(1V2). TjJ(t) —willbe uncorrelated
with the wage disturbance if the job effects are 0 or are not related to
separations. Note that since TjjtTj =Tj+ Tjj(t) —Ti,use of both Tt
and Tjj(t) —T1in the first stage equations is similar to estimation using Tj
—T1.Similarly, one may add Tjj(t)2 —Ti2and OLDJOBiJ(t) —OLDJOBito the
experience. They report a reduction in the tenure profile of about 15%when
N EXP is added. They find virtually no reduction for the NLS sample of
young men lnria 40% reduction for the NLS sample of older men. Note that the
experience coefficients in columns 10—12 are not comparable with those in 1—3
because N/EXP falls over the lifetime for a typical worker. See Mincer and
Jovanovic and Mincer(1984) fora detailed analysis of this variable.—26—
first stage equations for the tenure variables. (The first stage equations for
the 1V2 e stimator are reported in columns 4—6 of Table A2.)
The 1V2 parameter estimates are displayed in columr 7—9 of Tabl3 1.
predicted values. The use of the variation in the tenure means across jobs
leads to a modest changes in the estimates of the tenure slopes when Tt
and h_i)Jbiit are all present in the wage equation (compare columns 6 and 9).
The extra effect of the first year of tenure rises to .073, and the overall
effect of 10 years of tenure is about 7.5%. This exceeds the 1V1 estimate of
2.7 by about 3 standard errors, but is far below the OLS estimate of 30%. A
formal Hausman type test of the null hypothesis of exogeneity of —ij(t) 1,
Tjj(t)2 —Tiand OLDJOBij(t) —0LDJOBilead to rejection the hypothesis at the
.001% level .
Insummary, both the 1V1 and 1V2 results indicate that tenure plays only a
modest role in wage growth, with general labor market experience accounting for
most of the growth. The tenure estimates lie considerably below estimates based
upon least squares and use of a prior mobility index as a control for individual
*
FollowingNewey (19811, pg.6) we performed the exogeneity test by testing
for the joint significance in the wage equation of the residuals from
regressions of the three additional instrumental variables against the
maintained set of instrumental variables. The covariance matrix of the
parameter estimates of the wage equation used in forming the test statistic
was calculated using the 1V2 (Tab1 1, column 9) estimate of the residual ari nce
and with the correlation in the error -acrossobservations on the same
individual and the same job match taken into account.
The fact that the 1V2 a stimates of the tenure profiles are much closer to
the 1V1 results than to the OLS results does not provide clear evidence on the
relative Importance of individual heterogeneity and job match heterogeneity in
biasing the OLS results. To see this, note that about 1/2 of the observations
come from individuals who held only one job during the years in which they are
in the sample. For these observations, the additional instrumental variables
[Tij(t) —T,Tjj(t)2 —T12,NewJobi.()—NewJob1l used in the 1V2 procedure
are identically 0 and add nothing to te instruments for the tenure
variables. Adding the deviations from individual means has little impact on
the R2's of the first stage equations for the T and T2 but does make a
substantial difference in the equation for OLOJOB. See Table A2.—27—
heterogeneity.
5.3 GLS Estimates
The columns of Table 2 report GLS estimates which correspond to the OLS
results in columns 1—3 and 10—13 of Tabla 1 as well as 1V1—GLSand1V2—CLS
estimates which correspond to the 1V1 and 1V2 e stimates of columns 4—6 and 7—
9. The estimates of the covariance matrix of the residuals for each individual
used in the GLS calculations are based upon the correlation of the wage
residuals for a given individual across different jobs and upon the correlation
for a given individual in the same job. These estimates equal 0.46 and 0.59
respectively and were calculated from the IV1 equation estimate in column 6 of
Table 1. Wry similar estimates were obtained using the residuals from the OLS
estimates,* and so we have employed the same residual correlation matrix in
computing all of the results in Table 2.
Comparison of columns 3 and 12 of the two tables indicates that GLS
produces a dramatic reduction in the least squares estimates of the wage—tenure
profile, regardless of whether one controls for prior job mobility. For
example, OLS estimates of the model with T, T2, and OLDJOB imply that 10 years
of tenure are associated with an increase in wages of about 30%, while the
*
Usingthe 1V1 equation from Table 1 (Col. 6), the corresponding correlation
estimates are 0.42, 0.57). Using the 1V2 equation (Col. 9), the correlation
estimates are (0.45, 0.59). Using the N/EXP equation (Col. 12), the
correlation estimates are (0.42, 0.58).For the 1V1 equation, the estimates of
the variances of ijt' Cj and are .069, .077, and .022.
(The estimate of the variance of is exaggerated by the presence of
serially uncorrelated measurement error in the wage, although this has no
bearing on estimation of the wage of equation.)Thus, the job match
component accounts for substantial fraction of the error variance. This is
consistent with Cline(1979a). Note that the estimates above as well as the
estimates for nonunion workers and blacks used in correcting the standard
errors of tabl 5 and 6 are based upon the residual variance, the average of
the cross products of residuals between periods in which the individual held
different jobs, and the average of the cross products between periods in which
the individual held the same job. The variance decomposition is based upon
the assumption that is serially uncorrelated.—28—
correspondirg GLSestimateis only 13.1%. The GLS estimates of the coefficients
on T and OLDJOB are .0044 and .074 (respectively), which are well below the OLS
estimates of .0178 and .111. The reduction in the estimated tenure slope is
accompanied by a large offsetting increase in the experience slope.
The impact of GLS is far too large to be explained by sampling error.
As was explained earlier, it is fully consistent with the presence of strong
heterogeneity bias in the OLS estimates. This interpretation is strongly
supported by comparison of the 1V1 e stimates in columns 4—6 of Table 1 with the
1v1—GLS results in columns 4—6 of the TabIr 2. The GLStransformationhas only
a small effect on the 1V1 estimates, although the point estimates of the
coefficients on individual coefficients in the education—experience polynomial
change somewhat. The tenure coefficients are virtually unchanged. The 1V1—GLS
estimate in column 6 implies that 10 years of tenure produces a wage increase of
2.2%, while the corresponding 1v1 estimate is 2.7%. The experience profiles are
also very close. Since the 1V1 procedure does not use variation in tenure
across jobs and across individuals to identify the tenure effect, it is less
sensitive to CLS. The 1V2 estimates using deviations from individual means as
well as deviations from job means as instrumental variables also change by only
a small amount.
5.4 Evaluating the Performance of OLS and 1V1 in Predicting Wage Changes.
The most natural check on the OLS and 1V1 e stimates of the tenure slope is
to compare their performance in predicting the change in the wage across years
in which the job does not change (stayers) and for observations with a job
change (movers). If the 1V1 tenure slope is correct, then one would expect the
predicted wage changes based on the OLS coefficients to be greater than the
actual wage changes for stayers, and to be less than the actual wage changes for
job changers. The 1V1 estimates should be accurate for both groups.—29—
Furthermore, the OLS prediction errors should be systematically related with the
change in tenure from year to year. Roughly speaking, this is what we find.
Tabi 3 reports the difference between the actual and predicted values of
as a function of tenure in period t—l. For purposes of comparison, Table
3 also reports OLS and 1V1 estimates (based upon the tenure coefficients in
Table 1) of the contribution of the change in tenure between t—l ciivri t to the
expected value of given tenure in period t—i. On average, the OLS
equation predicts that will equal .046, while the mean of is .026,
an overprediction of .020. Furthermore, a comparison of columrs 3 and 4 reveals
that the prediction errors are systematically related to the estimated
contribution of tenure to the wage change. On the other hand the 1V1 procedure
slightly overestimates wage growth for stayers. The 1V1 prediction errors are
small at all tenure levels.
For movers, OLS dramatically underpredicts The average prediction
error is .095, which compares to the average value of is .058. Since the
tenure coefficients have little effect on the average of the predicted wage
change for persons with T1jt_i between 0 and 1, ituseful to compute the average
prediction error for persons with Tjjt_l greater than 1. For this group, OLS
underpredicts W1j by .169. Comparison of columtE 3 and 4 reveals that the
prediction error is systematically related to the OLS estimate of the
contribution of the change in tenure to the wage growth. In contrast, the 1V1
prediction errors average only .029 and are not systematically related to tenure
level.
Table 3 also reports separate results for quits and layoffs. They show
that the OLS equation performs very poorly for both groups, and that the
prediction errors are systematically related to the OLS estimate of the
contribution of the change in tenurthe wage change. The 1V1 estimates perform—30—
much better than the OLS estimates for both quits and layoffs, although the 1V1
estimatesunderpredict by .058 and .015 for quits and layoffs respectively.
(The latter figure is not significantly different from zero.) The prediction
errors are not systematically related to Tt_i.
In summary, the results of the prediction tests are basically favorable to
the 1V1 e stimates and indicate that the OLS estimates of the tenure slope are
seriously overstated. These tests cast serious doubt on the view that
measurement error in the tenure variable is responsible for the difference
between the OLS and 1V1 results. The sample means of the changes in tenure for
each initial tenure level underly the predictions. Random measurement error in
the tenure variables should have little effect on these. However, the fact that
1V1 e stimator tends to underpredict for quits by a constant amount is consistent
with the notion that the job shopping process leads to an increase in ej()
with experience. As was explained earlier, the resulting correlation of Cij(t)
with experience would produce a downward bias in the tenure slope which offsets
an upward bias in the experience slope. It seems unlikely that these biases are
large given the poor performance of the OLS equation, the fact that the 1V1
prediction errors are not related to tenure level and are very small for
layoffs, and the fact that the the 1V1 procedure actually overpredicts wage
growth (slightly) for stayers. In any event, we provide additional analysis of
the possible biases which arise from job shopping and from measurement error in
the next two sections.
5.5 Analysis of Bias from Qnission of Eij(t)
Let the 1V1 instruments for Tjt and 0LDJ0B1 be denoted by T1t
and OLDJOBjJt respectively, and let L.i'denotethe vector [Tj Tjt




whei 1I and are the matrices of coefficients of the first, stage equations for
Tjjt, 'ft and OLDJOBj reported in Table A2. From the Theil—Griliches
formula for the analysis of bias due to an omitted variable (See Theil (1971),
Ch. 12), the bias Bblas in the coefficients of the wage equation which arises




In most niultivariate contexts, one cannot even sign the elements of Bbias,
let alone assess them quantitatively. Since the omitted variableij(t) is not
observed, it cannot be used directly to estimate jItr' Jt[XijtTijt]'ij(t1
which is the cross product of the included regressors with the omitted variable
and is required to evaluate the bias formula.
In the present case, however, one may infer a great deal about these cross
products. First, and most important, andOLDJOBjjt are orthogonal to
Elj(t) by construction. Consequently,
!ijtl'EiJ(t) reduces to [xijt Lhh1]'eiJ(). Second, many of the
elements of such as schooling, region, SMSA are not likely to directly
influence tlj(t), given that ij(t) is defined to be net of the fixed individual
characteristics such schooling. The problem of bias arises primarily because
£jj(t) is correlated with experience as a result of job shopping over the course
of a career. For this reason, we assume that correlations of£ij(t) with the
other variables in the model arise only to the extent that they are correlated
with experience. In this case, one can estimate the crossproducts between
and the explanatory variables in the model if one can estimate the
conditional expectation of €ij(t) given experience, which we denote by
[cjj(t)IEXPit]. If [E1j(t)EXPjt]isknown, one may then compute Bbias as—32—
(7) Bbias =Pm[.[(Zjjt ij)1]1
We obtain a set of estimates of [rj3(t)EXPit] by combining information on
the experience profile of quits with a range of assumptions about the expected
value of the wage change resulting from a quit. The very small errors of the
1V1 estimator in predicting wage growthfor 'those who quit, and evidence on the
total growth in wages arising labor market experience over a career provide a
check on the plausibility of the assumptions about wage gains per quit. We
ignore layoffs under the conservative assumption that on average theyresult in
a zero change in cjj(t). If they are associated with negative changes,then
consideration of layoffs would result in even smaller estimates of the bias than
those reported below.
Let Jobsit equal the expected number of times a typical worker has quit
conditional on the experience EXPIt of the worker in time t. Jobsit may be
approximated as
Jobsit it PQ(X)
where PQ(X) is the probability that a worker with experience X will quit during
the year. We estimate PQ(X) from a logit model relating the quit probability to
a constant, EXP, EXP2, andgp3•* Finally, we estimate [ejj(t)EXPjt] as the
product of Jobs1t and an assumed value for the average change in tjj(t) per
quit and use (6) to compute BbiasThe assumed value for the change in
ranges from .025 to .100. We consider .100 to be an upper boundfor the change
in tij(t) per quit for two reasons. First, if one assumes that the average
change in tlj(t) associated with layoffs is less than or equal to zero, then the
difference .046 (with a standard error of .023) between the means of the actual
change in tW1j for quits and for layoffs provides an upper bound on the average
*The implied probability of a quit in the first, 5th, 10th, 20th, and 30th
years in the labor market are .394, .191, .120, .056 and .035 respectively.—33—
gain in rl(t) associated with a quit. (This comparison requires the assumption
that the sample distributions of quits and layoffs by experience and tenure
levels are the same, which is approximately true.) In view of this figure, our
preferred estimate of the gain per quit is .05. Second, as we shall see
momentarily, the assumption that the average gain per quit is .100impliesthat,
for the average worker, 55.9 % of the gain in wages associated with labor market
experience is due to increases in Eij(t) resulting from job shopping and 44.1 %
is due to the direct effect of experience.
The upper panel of Table 4 reports estimates of Bbias under the various
assumptions about the average gain perquit.If the gain is .05 ,thenthe bias
in the estimate of the returns to 10 years of tenure on the log wage is biased
downward by .0375. The "corrected" coefficients on T, T2 and ULDJOB are .0005,
.0012, and .0435 respectively, and the "corrected" estimates of the effects of
10 years of tenure and 30 years of experience on the log wage are .0643 and
.4405. The implied average growth in cij(t) over 30 years of experience is
.1835. Whenthegain per quit is assumed to be .100, the "corrected" estimates
of the effect of 10 years of tenure and 30 years of experience are .1019 and
.2570 respectively, and the average growth in cij(t) over 30 years is .325.*
In summary, the analysis of bias in the 1V1arisingfrom the correlation of
experience with ejj(t) suggests that the percentage gain in the wage from 10
yearsof tenure mightbeas large as 10.7 %,althoughour preferred estimate is
6.6 %.
Analternativeway to analyze the important of bias arising froa failure to
control for Cij(t) is to compare the 1V1estimatesto estimates obtained using a
*If onewere to assume the gain is .150perquit, the revised estituate of
the effects of 10yearsof tenure is only .139,whichis still only halfof
the OLS estimate in in Table 1, column3. e do not consider this case in the
textin part because the it implies a corrected estimate for the direct effect
of 30 years of experience and growth in cij(t) equal to only .074.—34—
fixed effect for each job to control for both cij(t) and r. As was noted
earlier, only the sum of the coefficients on EXP, T, and the time trend are
identified when the "job effects' estimator is used. However, one may use the
test procedure suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981) to compare the subset of
experience and tenure parameters which are identified using the job effects
estimator with the corresponding 1V1 estimates. In practice, we use the 1V1—GLS
estimates in place of the 1111 estimates in performing the test, since we were
unable to find a way to adopt 1-lausman and Taylor's test to the case in which
neither estimator is efficient under the null hypothesis. The relevant subset
of the coefficient estimates from the 1V1—GLS and the job effects procedures are
displayed below.
Coefficient on
EXP+T+Time T2 OLDJOB EdEXPEXP2/10EXP3/100
Estimators
JOB EFFECTS. .0642 .00004 .0461 —.00026 —.0153 .00153
(.0052) (.00003) (.0072) (.00025) (.0020) (.00031)
1V1—GLS .0633 .00018 .0470 .00016 —.0185 .00187
(.0045) (.00007) (.0088) (.00018) (.0019) (.00028)
The point estimates are very close relative to the standard errors, and a formal
test of equality of the coefficient vectors passes.# It should be noted that
The standard errors of the job effects estimates reported in the text are
based upon an estimate of the variance of the transitory error component
which equals .047. (The loss of degrees of freedom which arises from additon
of the job constants to the model was taken into account in calculating this
figure.) This estimate is well below the corresponding estimate based upon
the 1V1 and 1V1—GLS procedures. We do not have a good explanation for why the
variance estimates differ. It may be related to the fact jobs lasting only
one period have no effect on the job effects estimator of the residual
variance. As a result, two of the diagonal elements in the difference betieen
the covariance matrices of the job effects estimator and the 1V1—GLS estimator
are actually negative if one uses the .047 figure to compute the covariance
matrix of the subset of job effects parameter estimates used in the test.
Unfortunately, the specification test is based upon
C1' [E1 —Z2]1c1, where c1 is the difference in the job effects and 1V1—GLS
parameter estimates reported in the text and and E2 are the covariance
matrices of the lob effects and 1V1—GLS parameter estimates (respectively ).
estimate[S1 —Si]of the covariance of c (a problem which frequently arises
in computing H?usman test statistics) and computes the test statistic, one
obtains 6.8, which is not significant at tl-e 10level. We used the IV1_GL
estimate of the variance of hut in computing S1. In this case, all diagona
elements of [S1—S2] are positive and the test statistic is 2.99.—35—
this test may not be sufficiently powerful to detect a small degree of bias in
the 1V1—GLS estimates, especially since the downward bias in the linear tenure
term is likely to be offset by an upward bias in the linear experience term.
Also, the point estimates from the Job Effects and the 1V1estimatorsdo not
match up quite as closely. Nevertheless, Job Effects estimates are additional
evidence that the 1V1 and 1V1—GLS results are in the right ballpark.
5.6 Analysis of Effects of Measurement Error in Tenure
As was explained earlier, a second potentially important source of bias in
the 1V1 estimates is measurement error in the tenure variables. The fact that
the GLS estimates are based on partial differencing of the wage equation is
likely to make them more sensitive than the OLS estimates to the problem of
measurement error for the same reasons that they are less sensitive to upward
bias due to heterogeneity.
The results of the prediction tests in Table 3 are strong evidence against
the hypothesis that measurement error offers an alternative to heterogeneity
bias as the main explanation for the large reduction In tenure slopes when 11,71
is used and when GLS Is substituted for OLS. However, we have performed a
additional checks on the measurement error problem in an attempt to improve upon
the 1V1 estimates. First, the wage equations were re—estimated with
observations for years prior to 1975 (the years in which tenure was bracketed)
excluded. The results for both OLS and the IV procedure are very close to those
In Table 1*. Second, an analysis of the frequency of the first difference of
*Forexample, the estimates of the effect of 10 years of tenure on the log
wage data implied by the OLS, 1V1 and 1V2 results for post 1974 sample are
.2654, —.0252 and .0392 respectively. The corresponding values for the full
sample (from Table 1, col. 3, ,and9) are .2627, .0268, and .0741.—36—
indicates that most of the observations lie in a plausible range. Third,
when the sample is restricted to observations over the post 1975 sample for
which the change in Tt is between .9 and 1.1 (unless a separation took place
between surveys)**, the coefficients on T, T2 and OLDJOB are —.0083, .00013, and
.0439. These are very close to the corresponding 1V1 estimates on the full
sample in Table 1, col 6, as are the implied estimates of the effects of 10
years of tenure and 10 years of experience. These results suggest that the
effects of measurement error are small.
In addition, an attempt was made to construct T1 using information only
on the number of sample observations corresponding to a particular match the
number of years between observations, and that fact tenure on a continuing job
should rise by one each year.It is not necessary to know the level of tenure
in a given year to construct Tjjt, since displacement of the tenure values in
all of the years by a constant makes no difference in Tjj. For the most part,
this information is based on whether or not an individual indicated that he had
been on his current job for less than a year.It does not depend directly on
the specific number of years reported for tenure, although some dependence will
arise as a result of the procedures used to impute tenure values (see Appendix
2). Hopefully, measureiiient error in the alternative Tj measure will be weakly
related to measurement error in Unfortunately, it is necessary to know
the tenure level to construct (T13)2 and 0LDJUB. We used OLDJOBIJt as is,
since measurement error in OLDJOBIjt should not be much more of a problem for
the 1V1 procedure than for OLS. To construct (T1)2 we took the tenure
observations corresponding to a given job and fit a least squares regression of
**This excludes some good observations on individuals who started jobs
less than .9 years before the survey and who were unemployed at the time of
the prior survey.—37—
tenure against an intercept and time, with the time slope constrained to 1.
Separate regressions were run for each job match in the sample. The squares of
the predicted values of tenure from the reqressions were used as measures of
for purposes of constructing (T3t)2. The 1V1 procedure was implemented
using the new measures of and (Ti)2 and the old measure of 0LDJ01t as
instrumental variables for the tenure variables. The coefficients on T, T2, and
OLDJOB for the specification corresponding to Table 1, Col 6 are —.0024, .00017,
and —.046. These estimates imply that wages rise by 4% after 10 years of
tenure, which is slightly above the earlier estimate of 2.7%.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that even if the 1V1 estimates are
biased downward by a. factor of 3, (with measurement error accounting for 2/3 of
the variance in the 1V1 instrument for tenure), most of the difference between
the 1V1 and OLS estimates of the tenure profile would remain. The evidence
above suggests that the bias from measurement error is small.
5.7 Differences between Blacks and Whites and Union and Nonunion Workers
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A4 report OLS estimates of the wage equation for
samples of white men and black men respectively, and Column 3 reports the
difference between the two groups in the coefficients. Corresponding 1V1
estimates are reported in columns 3—6. The OLS results suggest that the tenure
profile of wages is about a 15% less steep for blacks than for whites. The
growth of wages with experience in the labor market is less than half as steep
for blacks than for whites.
The small racial differential in the tenure profile disappears when the 1V1
is used to correct for heterogeneity, and both groups have very flat tenure
profiles. Thirty years of experience results in a wage increase of for
If one triples the 1V1 estimate of the effect of 10 years of tenure on the
log of the wage, one oStains .084. This compares to the OLS estiuate of
.263.—38—
whites and 35.5% for blacks.In summary, the evidence is that the effects of
tenure are relatively small for both groups and are much less important than
differences in wage growth with labor market experience in explaining racial
differences in wages.
Table 6 compares estimates of the wage equation for the samples of union
and nonunion white workers. The OLS results indicate that the OLDJOB effect on
wages is smaller for union than nonunion workers (.03 eid .09 respectively).
The tenure slope for union workers Is also significantly flatter, which confirms
earlier studies. As shown in the Table 6 these estimates imply that during
the first ten years on the job wages rise by about 24% for nonunion workers and
10% for union workers, and this difference is highly significant. The
experience profiles are very similar.
Once again, the 1V1 results tell a different story. The estimates of the
tenure profile decline sharply for both groups, but the decline is much larger
for nonunion workers than for union workers. No significant difference in the
effects of tenure on wages remains once heterogeneity is controlled for using
the 1V1 procedure. The decline in the estimated difference in the tenure
profile is accompanied by a substantial increase in the experience profile for
both groups. The effect of 10 years of experience on wages is very similar for
the two groups, but 30 years of experience is associated with a 89.7 % increase
for nonunion workers and a 70.2% increase for union workers. It reflects an
increase in the estimated experience profile for nonunion workers when IV is—39—
used.
The differential impact of 1V1onthe union and nonunion samples is
consistent with the notion that union jobs and union workers are more
heterogenous than nonunion jobs and workers. The mean squared errors of the 1V1
wage equations in Tables 4 are about .109 for the union sample and .185 for t
nonunion sample. It may also be attributed to the fact that union jobs are more
desirable than alternative jobs for broad classes of workers, which reduces
heterogeneity bias resulting from quits in the first few years on the job by
workers for whom the job is a poor match. Finally, it is consistent with the
notion that union contracts (1) restrict the extent to which wages received by
individual workers reflect the quality of the job match and (2) restrict the
extent to which employers may selectively layoff workers who are below average
in productivity.*
5.8 Effects of Individual Specific and Match Specific Wage Components on Quits,
Layoffs and Separations
Note that the effect of education on the wage for union workers is much
smaller than for nonunion, which is consistent with many previous studies.
The coefficient on the interaction of education and experience is positive for
nonunion members and negative for union members. The overall similarity of
the OLS estimates of the experience profiles for union and nonunion workers is
somewhat surprising, since other studies (for example Freeman (1980, Table 3)
using CPS data on blue collar workers without controls for tenure, Mincer
(1983, Table 12) using the 1968—1978 PSID data with controls for tenure) have
obtained a flatter experience slope for union workers. The difference between
our results and Mincer's are related to the fact that Mincer obtains a flatter
tenure slope for nonunion workers than for union workers, while we obtain a
much steeper nonunion slope when OLS is used. Most prior studies (See Mellow
(1981) and Block and Kushkin) obtain flatter tenure profiles for union than
for nonunion workers. There are many differences between Mincer's study and
ours, but we do not have a good explanation the difference in these results.
When we exclude tenure from the model and estimate by OLS, the nonunion
experience slope is indeed steeper than the union slope. As is discussed in
the text, the 1V1 results indicate that the experience slope is steeper for
onunion than union workers.
Freeman (1980) provides evidence that unions reduce wage dispersion
associated with both observed and unobserved characteristics of jobs and
workers.—40—
Table 7 provides some direct evidence on the role of unobserved
heterogeneity in the job mobility equations. The fact that consistent estimates
of the wage parameters may be obtained using the 1V1 procedure permits
estimation of the individual component c as the mean of the wage residuals
for a given individual and estimation of cij(t) as the deviation of the wage
residuals over a given job match from the individual mean c. The estimates c1
and Cjj(t) are then added to logit models for quits, layoffs and separations to
see if the individual components and job components are in fact related to job
mobility, both with and without controls for tenure. The table reports the
implied estimates of the partial derivatives of the quit, layoff and separation
probabilities with respect to these variables (evaluated at the mean quit,
layoff, and separation probabilities). The point estimates should be treated
with caution for a number of reasons. Both and dI() are subject to
sampling error from the averages of the transitory wage component Since
relatively few job spells are observed for most individuals, the estimate of
is subject to sampling error due to the match components ci(). Finally, the
tenure coefficients may be biased by heterogeneity which is not control for by
individual specific and job specific wage components.
Despite these problems, the qualitative results are quite interesting.
has a negative coefficient in the quit, layoff and separation equations. A one
standard deviation (0.33) increase in this variable is associated with a fall of
0.05 in the separation rate when tenure is not controlled for .032 when it is
controlled for. Cjj(t) has a large negative coefficient in the quit and
separation equations, a smaller negative coefficient in the layoff equation.
Overall, the results indicate that the individual component and job match
Note that the effect of on layoffs reflects variation across matches
in wages relative to produc.ivity since unobserved productivity differences
are not controlled.—41—
components are both negatively related to the separation rate and thus
positively correlated with job tenure. These findings support our earlier
conclusion that the OLS estimates of the tenure profile suffer from a
substantial upward bias.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The instrumental variables estimates of the wage equation indicate that
tenure has a modest effect on wage growth, with total labor market experience
accounting for most of the growth during a career. Holding the effect of total
experience constant, wages rise by slightly under 5 percent in the first year on
the job and decline slightly thereafter. The accumulation of 10 years of tenure
is responsible for a wage increase of 2.7 ¼. Our analysis indicates that this
estimate is probably downward biased as a result of correlation between
experience and the job match error component and as a result of measurement
error in tenure. We would not rule out the possibility that the true effect of
10 years of tenure is 2 or 3 time as large as tIm 2.7% figure and would use
choose 6.6% as our preferred estimate. However, it is clear that heterogeneity
bias is responsible for the much larger least squares estimates of the tenure
profile discussed in the introduction. The evidence indicates that positive
bias in the least squares estimates arises from individual heterogeneity and job
match heterogeneity. The large change in the least squares estimates when CLS
is used, the fact that the results for nonunion workers (presumed to be more
heterogenous and in more heterogenous jobs) are more sensitive to the estimation
procedure, and the fact that the estimates of the individual specific and job
match specific error components are negatively related to mobility is further
evidence that heterogeneity is important. Our findings are fully consistence
with the fact that estimates of the tenure slope based upon the relationship—42—
regressions with fixed effects for each individual and regresssions of the
change in the wage upon the change in tenure and the usual controls are almost
always well below those obtained by regressing the level of the wage against
tenure, although the individual fixed effects and first difference methods do
not deal adequately with job heterogeneity.
Our results have important implications for models of wage growth and job
mobility. First, they suggest that worker specific financed investments in
human capital may be too small to explain the decline. in quits
with tenure that is observed in simple least squares or logit estimates of the
quit function. However, they leave open the possibility that most of the
returns to the investments are received as fringe benefits rather than wages,*
and that the tenure slope of total compensation is sufficiently steep to explain
most of the drop in quits. The results also leave open the possibility that
firmfinancedspecific human capital investments are large, since such
investments would not show up in wage growth, and thus the small tenure effect
on wages does not speak directly to the issue of whether the strong negative
partial correlation of tenure and layoffs is due to heterogeneity bias. A drop
in the layoff probability is likely to increase the value a worker places on his
job and thus to reduce the quit probability as well. Conclusions about the role
of specific capital accumulation in the layoff and quit profiles will require
further research.
Second, the estimates of the effects of total labor market experience are
consistent with the view that worker financed investments in general training
Studies by Mitchell (1984) and Bartel(1982) indicate that fringe benefits
rise with time on the job and that these play a role In the quit decision. We
have not consider these factors, in part, for lack of data.This is an
important research question. Note that in assessing the links among tenure,
fringe benefits, and mobility it will be necessary to deal with the problems
of individual heterogeneity and job heterogeneity which have been the focus of
this study.—43—
are important.
Third, our finding that most wage growth is associated with total labor
market experience rather than seniority contradicts the supervision, sorting,
and risk aversion models of wage growth discussed in the introduction. This is
because these theories are primarily explanations for an increase in
compensation for the current job relative to the worker's alternatives.
Consequently, the results tend to support growth in productivity with
experience, as emphasized in human capital theory, as the dominant explanation
for overall effect of experience on earnings, although they are consistent with
an important role for job matching and labor market search.
A long research agenda remains. A number of limitations of the present
study have been mentioned in the text. It would be desireable to attempt to
encorporate unobserved differences in experience and tenure slopes (this will
not be easy) and to implement the procedures using an alternative data set.
Recent studies by Brown (1983), Duncan and Hoffman (1979) and Mincer (1984) have
used information on the occurrence of training on the job to study directly the
links among training, experience, and wages. The results indicate that growth
in wages on a given job is much higher during the training period than after,
lending support to the human capital hypothesis. The findings of the present
study are consistent with these training effects only if most of the wage growth
carries over to other jobs (the training Is general).* This remains to be
determined.** It is also unclear whether our results or those of the above
*Duncan and Hoffman's(1979) finding that black men are less likely to be
receiving training than white men is consistent with the finding that the
perience profile for these workers is flatter than that of white workers.
Mincer finds a negative association between the training measure and
mobility. Taken at face value, this result suggests that some of the training
is firm specific. However, it is possible that it Is due to heterogeneity
bias may explain it. Reference should also be made to the work of
Bishop(1979).—44—
studies can be reconciled with the work of Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981), who
find that wages of workers within the same grade level improve with seniority
and prior experience while performance evaluations do not. Techniques similar
to the instrumental variables procedures of the present study may provide a
useful way to address possible biases due to Individual heterogeneity and job
heterogeneity in sorting out the effects of training on the current and
subsequent jobs.
Finally, It would be usefulgo beyond the limited evidence presented In
Tab 3 of the paper and decompose our estimates of the returns to total
experience for the average worker into the direct effects of experience and the
gains from job matching and search. Our results are consistent with a
substantial role for both. However, a full solution to this problem would seem
to require joint estimation of the wage model, a quit model, and a layoff
model. This will be a difficult undertaken given the complexity of the quit and
layoff decisions and the severe econometric problems arising from job
heterogeneity and Individual heterogeneity.Al-i
Appendix 1 :Inversion of the Error Covariance Matrix
A standard result in matrix algebra is that for
(A.1) H=A+BDC,
H, A, and D all being square, non-singular matrices, then
(A.2)H' =A'-A1B(D+A1B)1CA1
It is apparent that this forrtula for the analytic inverse of a sum of
matrices is rrost useful when the inverse of A is known (or easily calculated),
and when D is of sufficiently small dinension to makeevaluationof the
second term in (A.2) relatively easy. Indeed, this formula is a corner-
stoneof traditional variance components analysis, such as thatdeveloped
byWallace and Hussein (1969), for example. In its absence, the computational
requireirentsforGLS in these rrde1s would be tooonerousto be generally
practical.
Henderson and Searle (1981) investigate special cases andextensions
of (A. 1) in termsofidentifying the inverse, andparticularlythose special
cases which have statistical applications, Our purpose in this appendix is
to derive the inverse for one of the cases not considered by Henderson and
Searle, but one which has wide applicability in analyses of panel data.
Suppose a particularindividuali in. a panel is observed to hold J different
jobs over a period of T years. Supposefurtherthat the residual in a




cii+ dit ,j=1,2,...,J ,
where is an individual effect, is a job—specific effect, and Lit is
a white noise error. Let the variances of the components be denoted by
a2
and Then it is easily verified that the DT covariance matrixA1-2
ofresiduals for each individual canbe written
21 + +
t 1 J
where Q is a co1unni vector (of lengthT)of units, andGis a DcJ
matrixsuch that a typical elerrent g=l if job jwas heldin year t, and
g=O otherwise. Thecorresponding correlation matrix, whichis a scalar
rtultiple of ,isgiven by
(A.3) = (i—p —p )I +p29' +pGG'
1 2 2 1.
where pandparerespectivelythe interterroralresidual correlations
due tothe job effect andtheindividual effect. It should be noted, ircre-
over, that the structure ofis individual-specific, because, first of all,
ofthe different numbers of jobs and tenure length in each job, and second,
because of ragged panels (i.e. different T for eachindividual).Thisrrkes
itall the rroreimperative to compute an analytic inverse for .
Thekey to the inversion ofis to note that (A.2) can be applied












+ ;then, itfollows directly from (A.2) and (A.4) that
(A 5) A' =II-____
Now,=A+
A3,sothat again from (A.2) and (A.4)
(A.6) =A'-A1G1i+ GA1G1G'A1
p1Al-3
Considerfirst the matrix G'A1G, whose elerrents, because of the structure
of G, consist of sums of elerrents of A'. Define Y. to be the number of J
yearsthat the individual is observed to be in job j,and define'G'AG.
Then, typicalelenEnts of 'are
1 ____ =_(y_J ) and jj 4)j 4)+Tp2
=_jk2
jk 4)
NCMdefine S +,whosediirension is JxJ, and whose typical
elenEnts can be written
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Notethat S can be written as the sum of a diagonal matrix and a matrix
of rank one. Defining y'=[Y1 Y2 ...Y.
I,then




Nowusing (A. 2) to invert (A. 7),
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Therefore,typical eleitents of 5' can be written
2
5Jj=____ —PiY
4)pY.4)pY sJ =-p jkA1-4
Butfrom (A.6)and the definition of S,
(A.6)' =A'—A1GS'G'A1
With A' given by (A. 5), and S1 by (A. 8), the exact analytic inverse
of cissimple to calculate from (A.6)'.
ccordingly, the GLS estimator, given a random sample of N individuals
eachobserved for T years,for a linear rtvdelofthe form
11ijt
whereE[ E.'1.(ofdinension T. x T.), is 11 1 1 1
N—1 1N
(A.9) =(EX'c2x.)(LX.c2
If consistent estimates of pandpareavailable (as might be obtained
- 1 2
fromOLS,forexample), an estimate ofcanbederived and used in (A.9) to
calculate theGLSestimates.Ifan instrumental variablesprocedure is used,
X.isreplaced in (A.9) by Z,whereZ. is the matrixofpredicted values of
X.obtainedfrom projection of Z. on the set of instrumental variables.
Finally,it shouldbe pointed out thatthere is no readily apparent or
simple data transformation consistent with 1 which willsimplifythe
*
calculationsin (A. 9), i.e. a matrix 0. such that X. =0.X. and
1 111
—1 **
(X1'c2 X) =(X'X).This feature has been frequently noted in similar
variancecomponents contexts.A2 -1
Appendix Data
The data are from the 1968—1981 Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
individuals tape. A few variables are based upon other sources, which are
identified below. Two working data sets were constructed, one for white male
heads of households and one for black male heads of households. The data sets
contain one observation for each person in each year the person was in the
sample. Although the survey starts in 1968, many individuals entered the
survey in later years. Individuals were excluded entirely if they were not
household heads in 1979, 1980 and 1981. Data for an individual were included
for a given year only if the following criteria were met:
1) The individual was employed, temporarily laid off, or unemployed in
that year, and had been employed, temporarily laid off, unemployed, a
student, or not in the survey in the previous year;
2) The individual was not soley self—employed, a government worker, or
from Alaska or Hawaii in the current year or in the previous year;
3) The individual was between the ages of 18 and 60, inclusive.
Persons with missing data on the variables in the wage equation were excluded
from the wage equation for that year.
NOTES ON THE VARIABLES
1) Education: Number of grades completed. This variable can take on
values from 0 to 17. Due to a programming error, education in 1975 was left
out of the data set. For this year it was assigned the mean of education in
1974and 1976. Education was bracketed in the Michigan survey prior to
1975. Consequently, an individual's value of education in 1976 was assigned
to all earlier years if the individual was over 28 years old in 1976.
2) Experience: Number of years worked since age 18. The Michigan Survey
asked this question only from 1974 to 1981, and asked it only of new heads of
households in 1975 and 1977—1981. Experience was imputed for years in which
it was missing in the following way. First, an individual was imputed to have
a year of work experience if hours worked in that year was greater than 100.
Then, years worked since age 18 was computed by counting backwards or foriards
from a year in which the experience question was actually asked. For example,
if an individual reported 20 years of experience in 1974, and reported 500
hours of work in 1973, experience tn 1973 was given a value of 19. Also,
experience was set to missing if it was greater than (age—education—5).
3) Union Membership: The variable is equal to 1 if the individual is a
member of a labor union, and 0 if not. This variable is missing from the data
in 1973; it was imputed for this year by averaging the 1972 and 1974 values,
or by assigning the non—missing value if either the 1972 or 1974 value was
missing.
4) Marital Status: 1=Married, 0=Single, Widowed or Divorced.
5) Health Limitation: This variable is equal to 1 if the individual
indicates that he has a health problem which affects his ability to work, and
is equal to 0 if not.
6) Wage Measure: This variable is the log of annual earnings divided byA2 -2
annualhours on the person's main job. The measure is deflated by the
personal consumption fix—weight price index (Source: 1983 Economic Report of
the president) and put into log form.
7) Quit, Layoff, and Separation Indicators: The PSID contains information
on tenure and separations for the years 1968—1981. However, the questions
relating to these items and the coding of the responses are not consistent
over the years, making it necessary to re—construct accurate measures of
employer tenure, quits and layoffs. Three major problems with the data
required attention. First, tenure levels are bracketed from 1968—1974. This
presents a problem for individuals with higher tenure levels, since the
bracketing at higher levels is coarse. Second, in the years 1969—1974, quits
are not distinguished from promotions. Third, the tenure question refers to
tenure with employer only in 1968, 1976, 1977, 1978 (for individuals under the
age of 45), and 1981. In the other years, the tenure question relates to
tenure "on the job" (1969—1975) or tenure in position (1978 for individuals 45
or older, 1979—1980).
A lengthy computer program was written to handle these problems. The
program, which will be provided upon request, filled in missing tenure data,
separated quits form promotions by cross—checking against other variables, and
constructed measures of employer tenure in years when this information was not
available. The following comments summarize the more important sections of
the program:
I. Tenure levels in 1968—1974 are set to the midpoints of the brackets.
A response of "over 19—1/2 years" is set to 23.
II. Tenure levels in 1978 (for individuals over 45 years and older),
1979, and 1980 are imputed by adding 1 to the previous year's tenure if no
separation between years was indicated, and setting tenure to .5 if a
separation was indicated. This process is performed sequentially, using
1977 tenure to impute 1978 tenure, then 1978 tenure to impute 1979 tenure,
etc.
[II. For individuals who reported quits/promotions in 1969—1974, the
following method is used to determine whether a quit or promotion had
occurred. A promotion is inferred if no unemployment had occurred in the
previous year, if there had been no change in the major industry group
reported by the individual, and if at least one of the following
conditions was true:
1) Employer tenure reported in 1976 is greater than 2 plus the number
of years between the survey year and 1976. For example, if an
individual reported a quit/promotion in 1973, but reported in 1976
that tenure with employer was greater than 5, it is assumed that the
individual had been promoted in 1973.
2) Employer tenure reported in 1977 is greater than 2 plus the number
of years between the survey year and 1977.
3) The tenure reported in the year following the survey year is
greater than 3.
4) The tenure reported two years after the survey year is greater
than 4.A2 -3
IV.Next,any missing data for tenure is filled in. First, if the missing
value for tenure occurred in a year in which the person was employed, and
if tenure reported in the following yar is greater than 1, current tenure
is set to next year's tenure minus 1.Second, if last year's tenure was
not missing and if the individual was in the labor force in the current
year, had experienced no unemployment in the previous year,and did not
indicate that a separation had taken place between the last and current
year, current tenure is set to last period's tenure plus1. If a
separation had been indicated, or if the individual had been outof the
labor force or experienced unemployment in the previous year, current
tenure is set to,5.
V. Next, for years in which "tenure with employer" is not specifically
asked, a check Is made to see whether reported tenure represents time in
position or time with employer. An imputed value for tenure iscreated
for the years in which tenure with employer was not asked by extrapolating
backwards from years in which tenure with employer was asked. The imputed
tenure value is created simply by letting current imputed tenure equal
next year's imputed tenure minus 1. For example, since 1976 tenure
represents years with employer, tenure in 1975 is set to tenurein 1976
minus 1, and imputed tenure in 1974 is set to imputed tenure in 1975 minus
1. Since tenure with employer must be greater than or equal to tenure in
position, a value of imputed tenure which is greater than reported tenure
in any "non—employer tenure" year serves as an indication that reported
tenure represents time in position rather than time with employer. If
imputed tenure is greater than current tenure plus 2, current tenure is
set to imputed tenure. If a separation had occurred between the current
year and the next year in which an employer tenure question wasasked,
imputed tenure would lie below reported tenure and so reported tenure
would not be changed.
This procedure also partially takes care of the problems created by
the bracketing of tenure in 1968—1974. Individuals with higher tenure
levels in these years will have large jumps in tenure as they move from
one bracket to the next. These jumps in tenure will be smoothed out.
However, the procedure does not compeletely smooth out tenure when an
individual stays in the same bracket for several years; tenure will be
smoothed only when it lies more than two years below imputed tenure.
VI. The last step of the program creates the separation, quit and layoff
variables. The separation variable is given a value of 1 if the
individual worked at least 200 hours in the previous year, and if one of
the following conditions is true:
*A?lly,tenure is set to next year's tenure minus one only if next
year's tenure is greater than 1, and either no separation occurred in the
between the current and last year or next year's tenure was less than 2.
If a separation occurred between the last and current year, the missing
value for tenure would get filled in by the next step of the procedure.
Likewise, a tenure value of less than 2 in the next year indicates that
the individual is in a new job in the current year, and so the missing
value would get filled in the second step of the procedure.A2-4
1) Tenure is less than 2 and the question "what happened to your last
job?"1 has a non—missing response which is other than "promoted"
(including "inferred promotion" created in step III of the program)
or "no previous job".
2) The individual is currently unemployed or out of the labor force
and the question "what happened to your last job?" has a non—missing
response other than "no previous job".
3) Tenure is between 0 and 1 and the question "what happened to your
last job"2 has a missing value.
Finally, for those who report that their job ended due to a quit or a
layoff and who are unemployed at the time of the survey there is some
ambiguity as to whether the separation occurred within the previous 12
month. For example, an individual may have been laid off 2 years ago and
suffered a long spell of unemployment, which raises the possibility that the
same layoff may be counted in two consecutive surveys. To minimize this
possibility, we employ a variety of checks using separations, unemployment,
and hours worked in prior years.
The quit variable is given a value of 1 if the separation variable is
equal to 1 and the reason for the separation is either "quit" or "was self—
employed before this". The layoff variable is given a value of 1 if a
separation is indicated and the reason for the separation is given as
"business failure", "strike, lockout", "laid off, fired", "other, incuding
military" or "seasonal or temporary job". Finally, if tenure was greater than
experience, it was set to missing.
8) Area Dummy Variables: The area indicators refer to residence in the 9
Census regions. Areal is the Pacific region. Area2 is the Mountain region.
Area3 is the West North Central region. Area4 is the East North Central
region. Area5 is the West South Central region. Area6 is the East South
Central region. Area7 is the South Atlantic region. Area8 is the Mid
Atlantic region. The omitted category is New England.
1This question is asked of currently employed individuals with raw tenure
of less than 1. Possible responses are: 1) business failure, 2) strike,
lockout, 3) laid off, fired, 4) quit, was self—employed before (1975—
1981), 5) no previous job, 6) was self—employed before (1968—1974), 7)
other, including military, 8) seasonal or temporary job, 9) don't know,
10) promoted (1975—1981), 11) inferred promotion (1968—1974, created in
step III of program).
2This question was asked of individuals currently unemployed or out of the
labor force. The coding is the same as given in footnote 1, except codes
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ComparisonofActual and Predicted Wage Changes for Movers and Stayers
OLS lvi















































































































































































































Average 1094 .079 .126 .058
(.013) (.013) (.013)
0-i. 602 .116 .078 0 .068 0
(.018) (.018) (.019)
1—2 147 .038 .136 —.129 .043 —.046
(.035) (.035) (.035)
2—3 139 .068 .194 —.150 .081 —.043
(.038) (.038) (.038)
3—5 56 —.024 .127 —.178 —.018 —.039
(.066) (.067) (.066)
5—7 93 —.023 .170 —.207 —.008 —.035
(.034) (.035) (.035)
7—10 16 .163 .404 —.241 .188 —.030
(.096) (.104) (.105)
10—15 31 .022 .306 —.287 .036 —.033
(.065) (.065) (.065)




Average 759 .033 .074 .015
(.019) (.019) (.019)
0-1 486 .067 .036 0 .029 0
(.023) (.023) (.023)
1—2 80 —.019 .092 —.129 —.000 —.046
(.076) (.075) (.024)
2—3 78 —.044 .072 —.150 —.043 —.043
(.054) (.056) (.056)
3—5 25 .092 .240 —.178 .088 —.039
(.079) (.075) (.075)
5—7 42 —.024 .180 —.207 —.001 —.035
(.087) (.086) (.086)
7—10 8 —.014 .208 —.241 —.007 —.030
(.124) (.131) (.135)
10—15 22 —.008 .333 —.287 .070 —.033
(.123) (.130) (.130)
15—25 14 —.178 .207 —.339 —.106 —.050
(.094) (.093) (.094)
25+ 4
5The estimated contribution of ATenure to AW1 is calculated from the tenure coefficients in
Table 1, column 3. for OLS and Table 1, column 6, for 1V1 .Thetenure contribution is evaluated
at the midpoint of all initial tenure categories eccept 25+. For this group, Tij1 is Set to 28.
For movers,Tjj
is set to .5 and 0LDJ0Bij 0 in calculating the contribution of the change In
tenure.
bsaiipie sizes for quits and layoffs do not sum to the totals for all Movers because reason for separa-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 2 ** **
T T Old Job T T Old Job T T OldJob
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
3.4969 63.7267 —.88613.5118 61.2299 —.8154 —.1562 29.5679 -1.1786
(3.73.) (2.41) (18.62) (3.86) (2.35) (27.74) (.15) (1.05) (18.50)
—.0569 2.8870 .0116 —.0710 2.2458 .0138 —.2053 —3.6472 .0076
(.49) (.88) (1.98) (.63) (.70) (2.97) (1.64) (1.04) (.96)
.0017 —.2010 .0002 .0017 —.1875 0001 .0066 —.0178 .0004
(.41) (1.78) (.85) (.45) (1.69) (.39) (1.53) .15) (1.45)
—.2637 —20.0356 .0639 -.3703 —21.1659 .0469 —.1973 —22.1964 .0945
(5.14) (13.94) (24.73) (7.47) (14.91) (22.93) (3.61) (14.50) (27.38)
EXP2 .0315 1.3024 —.0021 .0359 1.3333 —.0013 .0280 1.2610 —.0035
(12.81) (18.88) (17.05) (15.08) (19.56) (12.85) (10.66) (17.12) (21.10)
—.0005 —.0184 .ooOO2. —.0006 -.0184 .0000 -.0004 -.0159 .0000
(13.40) (16.97) {12.28) (15:10) (17.25) (7.77) (10.77) (13.79) (16.58)
.0133 .3821 —.0002 .0139 .3997 —.0002 .0157 .5195 —.0002
(7.83) (8.05) (1.89) (8.54) (8.57) (2.33) (8.63) (10. 23) (1.61)
.8374 16.4776 .0724 .8519 16.6861 .0741 .8703 18.1008 .0718
(5.37) (3.77) (9.21) (5.67) (3.88) (11.96) (5.20) (3.36) )6.79
UNII 1.4408 28.2501 .0826 1.3183 26.4995 .0690 1.4438 28.0567 .0878
(13.67) (9.56) (15.54) (12.98) (9.12) (16.47) (12.76) (8.35) (12. 29)
HEALT —.9652 —18.4859 —.0852 —.9611 —18.22 —.0818 —.8477 —15.0470 —.0777
(5.89) (3.94) (10.10) (5.96) (3.95) (12.30) (4.72) (3.00) (6.84)
CITT50O,000 —.0618 —.1976 .—.0094 —.0850 —.6562 —.0118 —.0360 .6173 -.0101
(.50) (.06) (1.51) (.72) (.19) (2.42) (.27) (.17) (1.21)
.7841 24.1788 .0032 .7845 24.45 .0029 .7755 23.4181 .0041
(7.17) (7.88) (.58) (7.44) (8.12) (.68) (6.60) (7.11) (.55)
—.3372 —6. (062 —.0132 —.2657 —5.0421 —.0122 .0698 2.7501 .0013
(22.32) (.5.31) (17.30) )IR.01) )11.) (23.13) )5.1P) )7.3) (1.13)
I —1.010 —27.9043 —.0131 -1.0470 —2P.45 —.0119 -.7036 '9 01 -.011
('.26) (4.10) (1.09) (4.55) (4.32) 1.(2) (3.27) (3.).( (.70)
AREA 2 —.9732 23.9743 —.0001 —.9675 —24.2949 .0017 -1.079 —28.3470 .0034
(3.22) (2.83) (.01> (3.33) (2.92> (.14) (3.33) (3. 12> (.17)
AREA 3 / 1.3137 35.9967 .0418 1.3022 35.9326 .0370 1.3618 37.1923 .0421
(5.37) (5.25) (3.39) (5.53) (5.33) (3.81) (5.18) (5.05) (2.54)
AREA 4 1.6323 42.8739 .0537 1.6058 42.6438 .0470 1.6191 42.2834 .0556
(7.26) (6.80) (4.73) (7.42) (6.88) (5.26) (6.71) (6.25) (3.65)
AREA 5 .2004 10.2026 .0038 .1599 9.6834 —.0028 .1552 8.3412 .0057
(.77) (1.41) (.29) (.64) (1.36) (.27) (.56) (1.07) (.32)
AREA 6 1.8346 46.3140 .0744 1.8072 45.8322 .0714 1.7856 44.4421 .0726
(6.94) (6.25) (5.58) (7.10) (6.29) (6.79) (6.29) (5.59) (4.05)
AREA 7 .3955 4.0687 .0448 .3940 4.0613 .0407 .5137 7.3351 .0450
(1.67) (.61) (3.75) (1.73) (.62) (4.32) 2.02) (1.33) (2.80)
AREA 0 .0868 3.0491 .0154 .0978 3.2282 .0141 .1100 4.1108 .0144
(.37) (.47) (1.32) (.44> (.51) (1.53) (.44) (.59) (.91>








014 Jobjj .1846 6.9634 .9863 .1d06 6.4363 9920
(.95) (1.28) (100.81)(.96) (1.20) (128.66)
Tjjt
.9059 —1.4363 —.0064 .8709 —2.1574 —.0061
(23.54) (1.33) (3.32) (23.49) (2.03) (4.03)
.0019 .9415 .0004 .0009 .9217 0003
(1.52) (26.64) (5.92) (.76) (26.52) (657)
P2 .52 .47 .55 .55 .49 .72 .45 .41 .16
SE 5.59 156.83 .28 5.39 154.16 .22 6.33 187.01 .33
•Co1a 1—3 ax. the first.taq. equation.s for Table 1 col. 4—6. Co1i.s4—6 ax. thefirst stageequat.onsfor Table 1 ccl. 6—9.
Obs.rvation.s— 15,138.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Altonji,Joseph C. ,Mincer,Jacob., and Shakotko, Robert H. TrployerI
EmployeeAttachments, Final Report to the U.S.D.L., Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Policy (March 1984).
Bartel, Ann P. and Borjas, George J. "Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An
Empirical Analysis." in S. Rosen (Ed.) Studies in Labor Markets.
New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, (1981).
Bartel, Ann P. "Wages, Nonwage Job Characteristics and Labor Mobility,"
Working Paper No. 552. National Bureau of Economic Research
September (1980).
Becker, Gery S. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis,"
Journal of Political Economy 70 No. 5 part 2 (October 1962): 9—49.
Block, Farrell, and. Kushkin, S. "Wage Determination in the Union and Nonunion
Sectors", Industrial and Labor Relations Review 31 No. 2 (January
1978): 153—192.
Borjas, George, J. "Mobility and Lifetime Wages," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review (1981).
Borjas, George J. and Rosen, Sherwin. "Income Prospects and Job Mobility of
Younger Men," in Research in Labor Economics 3 (1980):159—181.
Brown, James N. "Are Those Paid More Really No More Productive? Measuring the
Relative Importance of Tenure Versus On—the—Job Training in Explaining
Wage Growth," Working Paper No. 169, Industrial Relations Section,
Princeton University (October 1983).
Burdett, Kenneth. "A Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates,"
American Economic Review 68 No. 1 (March 1978): 212—220.
Cline, H. "The Effect of the Job and Job Mobility on the Wage,"
Discussion Paper 79—8, Dept. of Economics, University of
Rochester (December 1979).
Cline, H. "To Quit or Not to Quit," unpublished paper (1979b).
Duncan, Greg J., and Hoffman, Saul. "On-the—Job Training and Earnings
Differences by Race and Sex." Review of Economics and Statistics
61 (November 1979): 594—603.
Flinn, C. J. "Wages and Job Mobility of Young Workers," Draft,
(November 1982).
Freeman, Richard B. "Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 34, No. 1 (October 1980): 3—23.
Freeman, Smith, "Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productivity: A Model
and Application to Academic Early Retirement". Bell Journal of
Economics 8 (Autumn 1977):419—443.— R2—
Guasch,J. Luis, and Weiss, Andrew, "AnEquilibrium Analysis of
Wage—Productivitycaps", The Review of Economic Studies 49 (4) No.
158 (October 1982): 485—498.
"Wagesas Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive
Markets with Asymmetric Information: ATheory of Testing,"
Review of Economic Studies 49 (1980): 653—664.
Hall, Robert E., "The Importance of LifetimeJobs in the U.S. Economy"
American Economic Review (September1982): 716—721
Hamerniesh, Daniel, "The Costs of WorkerDisplacement", Working Paper No. 1495, National Bureau of Economic Research (November1984).
Harris and Holmstrom, Bengt. "Ability,Performance, and Wage Differentials."
Review of Economic Studies 49 No. 3(July 1982): 315—333.
Hashimoto, Masanori. "Firm—Specific HumanCapitalas a Shared Investment,"
American Economic Review 71 (June 1981):475—482.
Hausman, J. A. "Specification Tests inEconometrics", Econometrica
46 (1977):125].—1271.
Hausman, J. A. and Taylor, W. E. "Panel Data andUnobservable Individual
Effects," Econometrica 49 (November, 1981).
Heckman, James. "Heterogeneity and StateDependence," in Studies in Labor
Markets, S. Rosen ed. Chicago University Press(1981).
Henderson, H.V., and Searle, S. R., "OnDeriving the Inverse of a Sum of
Matrices.", SiamReview(1981): 53—60.
Johnson, William R. "A Theory of Job Shopping",Quarterly Journal of
Economics 92 (May 1978): 261—277.
Jovanovic, Boyan. "Job Matching and the Theory ofTurnover," Journal of
Political Economy 87 (October. 1979)
"Firm—Specific Capital and Turnover", Journal of
Political Economy 87, No. 6 (December1979b): 1246—60.
Kuratani, M. "Schooling, Human Capital and LaborTurnover," Ph. D. Dis-
sertation, Columbia University (1973).
Lazear, Edward. "Agency, Earnings Profiles,Productivity, and Hours
Restrictions," American Economic Review 71, no. 4(September 1981): 606—620.
Maddala, G. S., "The Use of Variance Components Models inPooling Cross—
Section and Time—Series Data," Econometrica(March 1971): 341—358.— R3—
Medoff,James L. and Abraham, Katherine G. "Are Those Paid More Really
More Productive?," The Journal of Human Resources 41, No. 2
(1981): 186—216.
__________________________________________."Experience, Performance, and
Earnings." Quarterly Journal of Economics 95 (December 1980):703—736.
Mellow, Wesley. "Employer Size, Unionism, and Wages," Office of Research
and Evaluation", U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (October 1981).
Mincer, Jacob. "Labor Mobility, Wages and Job Training" (March 1984)
______________"UnionEffects: Wages, Turnover, and Training," in
Research in Labor Economics, (1983)
______________Schooling,Experience, and Earnings, Columbia U. Press
New York. (1974).
and Jovanovic, Boyan. "Labor Nobility and Wages." in
Studies in Labor Markets. New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research (1981): 21—64.
Mitchell, Olivia S. "Fringe Benefits and Job Mobility," Journal of Human
Resources, 17 No. 2 (Spring 1982): 286—298.
__________________"FringeBenefits and the Costs of Changing Jobs,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review (1984)
Mortensen, Dale T. "Specific Capital and Labor Turnover."
The Bell Journal of Economics 9 (Autumn 1978): 572—586.
Newey, Whitney, "Generalized Method of Moments Specification Testing"
(1984) (forthcoming in Journal of Econometrics)
Nickell, Stephen J. "Wage Structures and Quit Rates." International
Economic Review 17 No. 1 (1976): 191—203.
Oi, Walter Y. "Labor as a Quasi—Fixed Factor." Journal of Political
Economy 70 (1962): 538—555.
Parsons, Donald 0. "The Employment Relationship: Job Attachment, Work
Effort, and the Nature of Contracts" September 1984 (forthcoming in
0. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics ).
_____________, "Modelsof Labor Market Turnover: A Theoretical and
Empirical Survey," in R. Ehrenberg (Ed.) Research in Labor Economics
Greenwich, CT: J.A.I. Press, (1977).
_____________"SpecificHuman Capital: An Application to Quit Rates and
Layoff Rates." Journal of Political Economy 80 (November 1972):
1120—1143.
Pencavel, John H. "Wages, Specific Training, and Labor Turnover in U. S.— R4-
ManufacturingIndustries." International EconomicReview 13 (February 1972): 53—64.
Rosen, Sherwin, "Implicit ContractModels: A Survey" unpublishedpaper (September 1984).
Rosen, Sherwin. "Learning andExperience in the Labor Market."Journal of Human Resources 7 No. 3(Sunmier 1972): 326—342.
Salop, S. C. and Salop J. "Self—Selection
and Turnover in the Labor
Market," 1arterly Journal ofEconomics 90 (November 1976):619—628
Wallace, T. D. and Hussian, A.The Use of Error ComponentsModels in Combining Cross Section with TimeSeries Data,"Econometrica,Vol 37, No. 1 (January 1969): 55—68.
Wu, D. "Alternative Tests ofIndependence Between StochasticRegressors and Disturbances," Econometrica.41 (1973):733—750.</ref_section>